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ABSTRACT  
   
Treating the Pro-Life Movement as a monolithic entity creates a blind spot 
regarding the cognitive effect of the fetal personhood rhetorical framework. This study 
applies an interpretive lens, using legal and discourse analysis as tools, to provide a 
critical analysis of personhood laws and web content to shed light on how linguistic 
patterns construct, and are informed by, worldview. Examining variations in proposed 
Human Life Amendments—and asking how, or if, proposed bills achieve their specified 
aim—reveals tension in state and federal jurisdiction of abortion regulations. It also 
exposes conflict concerning tactical preferences for attaining fetal personhood and ending 
abortion that are useful to differentiating the Pro-Life and Personhood Movements.  
Framing and discursive practices of the Personhood Movement reflect a ‘black 
and white’ mentality and an overly-simplified worldview. Movement cognition is shaped 
by patterns of omission and exclusion, inclusion, repetition, troubling phrases, and the 
power of labels. The linguistic choices demonstrate, constitute, and reinforce the 
dominant narratives of the movement and are integral to advocacy, praxis, and legislative 
efforts. While the struggle to pass personhood-compliant legislation has not been 
successful, the rhetorical practices and representational framework of the Personhood 
Movement have succeeded in altering the national discourse surrounding beginnings of 
life and abortion. The extreme views of the Personhood Movement reconstitute the 
middle—making tactics of the mainstream Pro-Life Movement seem moderate and 
reasonable by comparison, which allows dangerous legislation to slide by under the radar. 
Keywords: Personhood Movement, Human Life Amendments, discourse analysis, 
legal analysis, fetal rights, women’s rights 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the 
abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, …and of the deep and seemingly 
absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, 
one’s exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s 
attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one 
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking 
and conclusions about abortion.” 




In the majority opinion for the landmark Supreme Court case, Roe v. Wade 
(1973), Justice Blackmun observed that the Constitution neglects to define the term 
“person.” The state of Texas contended that a fetus is a person and a citizen, with a right 
to due process and equal protection. The Court did not agree and, after enumerating all 
mention of the word person in the Constitution, notes “in nearly all these instances, the 
use of the word [person] is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, 
with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application” (Roe v. Wade, 1973) 
This has not deterred the personhood faction of the Pro-Life Movement, which holds the 
sincere conviction that, from the moment of fertilization, the zygote is deserving of rights 
equal to that of the woman carrying it. The Personhood Movement believes that the right 
to life is paramount and must be protected throughout all stages of development; to 
achieve this goal, they seek to pass a Human Life Amendment—which seeks to redefine 
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life, and the protections associated with being a person, as starting from the moment of 
conception—to the United States Constitution. 
Activists “simultaneously create, are constrained by, and use law” in constructing 
their legal consciousness and the narrative surrounding it (Wilson, 2011, p. 455). There is 
a clear “social politics of fetal representation” (Oaks, 2000; Sanger 2008; Sanger, 2012a) 
and the very act of describing something as a narrative or a story may imbue it with 
myth-like qualities (Potter, 1996; Sanger, 2008; Wells, 2012; Madrazo, 2014). Legal 
consciousness, operating in the socio-political domain, contours the way movement 
activists interact with others to explain, justify, and promote belief systems and agendas.   
Labels and narrative play a significant role in the legal debate surrounding 
personhood because they determine the frame through which the discussion takes place 
(Saurette & Gordon, 2013; Madrazo 2014). Strategically, controlling the narrative and the 
frame through which the conversation on abortion and debate about personhood are 
interpreted carries considerable power. How life is understood, and when life is 
understood to begin, affects how we understand the cast of characters in these 
discussions. Who is depicted as a protagonist, who is depicted as the antagonist, the 
explanations used to assign roles, responsibility, and blame, as well as determine socially 
acceptable resolutions all rest on the construction of the life narrative ideograph 
(Madrazo, 2014, p. 331; Langford, 2015).  
This study offers a glimpse at the Personhood Movement—their discursive and 
rhetorical practices as well as their legislative efforts and activist communications—
applying an interpretive lens. It uses legal and discursive analysis as tools to provide a 
critical analysis in order to shed light on how speech patterns construct and are informed 
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by worldview, and how this affects legislative and community activism for advocates of 
personhood. The Pro-Life Movement is often treated as a monolithic entity in research 
and literature—this creates a blind spot regarding the political effects of the personhood 
discursive frame. The goal of this study is to offer a rigorous examination of how the 
strategic representational practices of the Personhood Movement enables successes in the 
larger Pro-Life Movement by asking: is there an evolution of the language of personhood 
bills and fetal representation over time? Is there a goal beyond the ratification of a 
Human Life Amendment? Why keep striving towards a goal many believe to be 
impossible or undesirable? 
The Personhood Movement is distinguished from the mainstream Pro-Life 
Movement based on legislative agenda. The Personhood Movement has a singular goal of 
establishing constitutional personhood at the state and federal level. The mainstream Pro-
Life Movement deploys a greater array of tactics, including incremental tactics, bills 
containing exemptions, and bills establishing indices of personhood in domains other 
than constitutional law. Personhood groups proudly identify as such—their writing also 
very clearly criticizes the mainstream Pro-Life Movement and makes explicit which 
organizations they consider to be allies and which organizations they consider to be 
guilty of capitulation and hypocrisy. (A more nuanced discussion of both factions of the 
movement and tactics deployed by each is the topic of Chapter 3). 
The following sections introduce the importance of representation, discourse, and 
framing of social movements in general, before moving to a detailed discussion of the 
representational trajectory of the Pro-Life Movement. I outline some of the disagreement 
among researchers about framing practices of the movement and contend that much of 
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the disagreement is due to the mistaken belief that the Pro-Life Movement is a 
homogenous entity. Next, through recognition of the personhood faction as distinct from 
the mainstream Pro-Life Movement, I argue that, even in the absence of legislative 
success, the discursive practices of the fetal Personhood Movement are cause for concern. 
I contend that the extreme rhetorical practices of the Personhood Movement work to 
reconstitute the middle in the debate surrounding start of life, legal personhood, abortion, 
and women’s role in these conversations. I close with an outline of the remaining 
chapters. 
Representation, Discourse, and Framing 
Representational and discursive practices matter because they dictate frame. 
Framing is critical to the success of a social movement as it has a role in defining and co-
constituting ideologies associated with the movement, as well as the power to mobilize 
activists around a cause (Johnston, 1995; Benford and Snow, 2000; McCaffrey and Key, 
2000). Frames work to situate the movement so that it appears to be culturally and 
socially relevant—both important factors in establishing legitimacy (McCaffrey and Key, 
2000, p. 41). The language selected by an individual or movement, and the patterns of 
speech, can be a powerful indication of worldview. Descriptions and categorizations, 
central to discourse, are powerful construction tools. In building movement frames, it is 
critical to bear in mind that descriptions and categorizations are also constructed 
(Johnston, 1995; Potter, 1996, p. 97). This vantage point allows for an examination of the 
importance of descriptions, and their subsequent roles in categorization, in order to 
disaggregate the ways in which they are “partial, related to interests, or work to obscure 
operations of power” (Potter, 1996: p. 69; Hawkesworth, 2005). For example, a 
  5 
description may portray something as completely normal or unexceptional, thus 
legitimizing it as reducing the attention paid to it. Conversely, description and 
categorization can be used to highlight the novelty of an object or act and draw attention 
to it. This argument rests on the presupposition that words matter. Word choice matters. 
The ways in which we compose our sentences, narrate our stories, and build our 
arguments affect the visual images called into mind, the emotions evoked, and how our 
message is received. This is especially true of the abortion debate where, “the use of 
emotional and psychological experience to relay the truth of abortion is not neutral; it 
does something, namely it holds the power to naturalise, in this instance, a profoundly 
political message” (Millar, 2016, p. 507). 
Representation, Framing, and Discourse in the Pro-Life Movement 
Some scholars tracing the trajectory of representational, discursive, and framing 
practices of the Pro-Life Movement focus their attention to the influence of religious 
beliefs, while others examine the shift towards a more pseudo-scientific, ‘woman-
friendly’ approach.  These findings and explanations appear contradictory if the Pro-Life 
Movement is viewed as homogeneous because this homogeneity results in a blind spot 
regarding the cognitive effect of the fetal personhood linguistic framework. The Pro-Life 
Movement is not a monolithic entity—there is a disagreement surrounding fetal 
personhood and compromise (Right Wing Watch, 2015). The personhood ideograph 
represents a tactical shift for the Pro-Life Movement in which they try to give the fetus a 
legal presence—and protection under the law—by dropping the modifier ‘fetal’ in their 
discussion of personhood (Langford, 2015). However, it is wise to acknowledge 
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“applying or denying the label of “person” prenatally is politically fraught for both sides” 
(Madrazo, 2014, p. 331). 
The religious framing of the debate on abortion has received sustained attention 
(Lake, 1984; Maxwell, 1994; Sanger, 2012a). Research demonstrates a strong salvation 
motive among women who had an abortion at some point in their lives before having an 
attitudinal conversion and becoming pro-life direct-action activists (Maxwell, 1994). 
Similarly, Randall Lake (1984) utilizes a logological approach to further his argument 
that anti-abortion rhetorical practices rely heavily on guilt and draw from Christian 
notions—particularly the idea of the descent/fall of man—to marginalize and victimize 
women while positioning “childbearing and legislating against abortion as twin paths to 
Redemption” (p. 426). He continues: 
Examined in this light, the anti-abortionist attempt to adopt a Human Life 
Amendment becomes more than a simple legal attempt to extend 
Constitutional rights to the fetus by wedding these rights to biological 
determinants…such an amendment symbolically reaffirms the original 
theological/deontological Covenants of Thou-Shalt-Nots, ensuring that the 
prescribed punishments for Disobedience will be enforced by the state, 
thereby making Redemption possible (1984, p. 436).  
Lake’s theories may more adequately describe the Personhood Movement than the 
mainstream Pro-Life Movement or the Pro-Life Movement as a whole, although he never 
explicitly acknowledges as much. By recognizing that the Pro-Life Movement is not a 
monolithic entity, it becomes possible to parse out the typographies of pro-life workers—
one such effort categorized them into “purists” and “pragmatists” with 
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“religious/instrumental” and “symbolic/instrumental” motivations (Maxwell and Jelen, 
1996). 
Other scholars contend that, in relaying “the truth of abortion” pro-life groups 
have sought to move away from the hyper-religious rhetoric and motion to reframe their 
arguments in quasi-feminist terms to broaden appeal and help destigmatize the more 
radical aspects of the movement; this reframing involves the discursive and 
representational practices of the movement increasingly embracing neoliberal buzzwords 
and pseudoscience to shape anti-abortion rhetoric (Roth, 2000; Siegel, 2008; Hughes & 
Wyatt, 2009; Halva-Neubauer and Zeigler 2010; Leinwand, 2015). There is a strong 
argument that the Pro-Life Movement’s attempt to restrict abortion through a “women-
friendly” approach has been largely successful. Through a close reading of legislative 
reform advocated for by the Pro-Life Movement and an analysis of the visual imagery 
they deploy, Glen A. Halva-Neubauer and Sara L. Zeigler (2010, p.101) contend that the 
rhetorical and representational practices of the movement have shifted from viewing the 
mother and the fetus as adversaries with conflicting interests to depicting the maternal-
fetal bond as central to the debate in a manner that undermines key talking points of the 
Pro-Choice Movement; the rebranding of the relationship as being entirely without 
tension enables legislative efforts that effectively promote indices of fetal personhood. 
This notion is supported by scholarship on measures including fetal protection laws 
(Daniels 1993; Duden, 1993; Henricks, 2015; Johnsen, 1986; Krauss, 1991), feticide laws 
(Crist, 2010; Daniels, 1993; Schroedel, 2000), stillborn birth certificates (Sanger, 2012b), 
informed consent laws (Seigel, 2008; Daniels, Ferguson, Howard, & Roberti, 2016), and 
even more restrictions. 
  8 
In crafting the fetus as a separate entity, and as a victim of ‘the crime of abortion,’ 
pro-life activists can work with the pretense of speaking for the fetus, enabling them to 
appear less radical and punitive than they would if they were solely campaigning against 
the interests of the woman (Lake, 1984, p. 434). Multiple scholars note the role of 
technology in detaching the fetus from the woman, humanizing the fetus, and emboldens 
pro-life activists to paint abortion as murder (Sanger, 2008; Wyatt and Hughes, 2009; 
Millar, 2016). Similarly, pro-life discursive tactics and framing strategies have developed 
the concept of ‘foetocentric grief’ in an attempt to sway the abortion debate (Millar, 
2016). The shift in pro-life advocacy from fetus-centered arguments, or arguments based 
on the presupposition that the woman and fetus have an adversarial relationship, to one in 
which the needs and interest of the woman and fetus align marks an important social, 
political, and legal development. It is possible that a discourse in which fetal personhood 
played a prominent role—either as an explicitly stated in political legislative efforts and 
conversations or an implicit assumption in the laws and debates animating their claims—
never went anywhere, but merely changed in representation and strategic deployment 
(Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler 2010, p. 102).   
Intervention and Argument 
This analysis offers a look at the relationship between narrative, law, and practice 
with a greater recognition of individual differences within the Pro-Life Movement by 
recognizing that the movement is not entirely homogenous and that there is a 
considerable divide over issues of compromise, religiosity, and the desirability and 
strength of the fetal personhood argument. I am drawing attention to a division 
acknowledged and remarked on by members of the Personhood and Pro-Life Movements. 
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The prime tactic of the Personhood Movement is the effort to pass a Human Life 
Amendment, establishing personhood and start of citizenship rights and protections, from 
the moment of conception—the rhetorical practices and discursive techniques of the 
movement reflect the singularity of focus and absolutism of the movement goal. The 
mainstream Pro-Life Movement, in an effort to broaden appeal, adopts a wider variety of 
tactics, approaches, and discursive practices, as noted by the extant literature on pro-life 
activism. 
Across macro, meso, and micro levels and sites of analysis, the discursive and 
framing practices of the fetal Personhood Movement are distinct from their pro-life 
counterparts. The rhetoric of the Personhood Movement reflects a ‘black and white’ 
mentality and an overly simplified worldview. The linguistic choices demonstrate, 
constitute, and reinforce the dominant narratives of the movement and are integral to 
advocacy, praxis, and legislative efforts. Repetition, patterns of omission and exclusion, 
inclusion, troubling phrases, and the power of labels all interact to shape and enable 
movement cognition. This is significant—and I argue dangerous—because the use of 
discursive and framing tactics of the fetal Personhood Movement contribute to a 
consciousness lacking in nuance or consideration of shades of grey; a consciousness in 
which women are the most notable omission; a consciousness that has completely erased 
the possibility of the debate it claims to want to create space for, because it has 
linguistically eliminated from its consciousness the vocabulary of any contradictory 
perspective. This is a consciousness that is both socially and politically dangerous and 
contributes to a range of actualized behaviors on a spectrum from benevolent sexism to 
hostile misogyny—impacting the lived experiences of real human beings, albeit female 
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ones. I argue that, even in the absence of legislative success, the mindset encapsulated in 
Human Life Amendments and the Personhood Movement is capable of doing 
considerable and lasting harm. 
I examined proposed Human Life Amendments from the ten years following Roe 
v. Wade, contemporary federal measures, and state efforts to establish personhood. 
Special attention and importance were given to language and framing, asking how—and 
if— the proposed bill would achieve its stated aim. What I found is that the laws, as 
written, are more symbolic than legally instrumental. They are not written in a way that is 
enforceable. Examining variations in laws reveals tension in state and federal jurisdiction 
of abortion regulations and conflict concerning the preferred tactics for achieving a 
Human Life Amendment and ending abortion; the variation differentiates the Pro-Life 
and Personhood Movements and can be used to track the relative success of movement 
frames.  
While the legislative effort to pass personhood-compliant legislation has not 
succeeded in passing an amendment at the federal or state level, the rhetorical practices 
and representational framework of the Personhood Movement has succeeded in altering 
the national discourse surrounding start of life and abortion. The extreme views of the 
Personhood Movement work to reconstitute the middle—making some of the tactics of 
the mainstream Pro-Life Movement seem sensible or moderate by comparison. This 
allows for dangerous pro-life legislation to slide by under the radar. 
The personhood effort is foundational to the success of the Pro-Life Movement; 
therefore, it is critical that the representational, discursive, and framing practices of the 
Personhood Movement are understood, challenged, and undermined. Recognizing that 
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poor, rural, minority, indigenous, and otherwise marginalized women are 
disproportionately impacted by pro-life legislation, I call on supporters of the choice 
framework to engage in rigorous self-analysis and to recognize areas in which an over-
willingness to compromise has excluded certain bodies and a fear of losing ground has 
caused activists to shy away from working to proactively expand rights and extend 
greater protections to marginalized groups. The choice paradigm is insufficient, as access 
to resources is a requisite for choice (Smith, 2005). A full-throated endorsement of 
women’s autonomy and rights must occur in order to remedy the disparity of convictions 
between the Pro-Choice and Pro-Life Movements and counter the influence of 
personhood rhetoric. 
Chapter Overview 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, provides an explanation of the methodology and 
what I mean by ‘an interpretive lens, using legal and discursive analysis as tools, to 
provide a critical analysis.’ It includes a discussion of my process, data generation, and a 
detailed description of the coding system, as well as an acknowledgment of my 
influences and assumptions—including more detail on my understandings of the 
importance and power of language. The chapter concludes with an honest reflection on 
my positionality and intentions. 
Chapter 3 introduced the concept of personhood in greater detail. It explains 
incremental strategies of the Pro-Life Movement and immediate strategies of the 
Personhood Movement and provides a brief overview of the effort to pass a federal 
Human Life Amendment. I argue that the Pro-Life Movement is not a monolithic entity 
and does not necessarily self-identify as a monolithic entity, despite being treated as such 
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in research. I provide evidence of the schism surrounding compromise and fetal 
personhood. I explain the different approaches taken by each faction and map out major 
players within each faction. I conclude by foreshadowing the danger of fetal-personhood: 
namely, it reconstitutes the middle and makes the mainstream Pro-Life Movement appear 
reasonable. 
Chapter 4 examines proposed Human Life Amendments from the ten years 
following Roe v. Wade, contemporary federal efforts to establish personhood, and state 
proposals, with special attention to language, and framing, asking how—and if— the 
proposed bill would achieve its stated aim. This section analyzes, in broad strokes, the 
similarities and differences among the proposed bills to ask what can be ascertained 
about the condition of the larger Pro-Life Movement, about state’s rights and federal 
jurisdiction, as well as state’s as a testing ground. I contend that the laws, as written, are 
more symbolic than legally instrumental because they are not written in a way that is 
enforceable—however, I do not mean to undermine my argument and imply that legal 
enforceability is the only way a bill can have an effect, symbolism can be emotionally 
and politically instrumental even if it is not legally instrumental. Examining variations in 
laws reveals tension in state v. federal jurisdiction of abortion regulations and conflict 
between the mainstream Pro-Life and Personhood Movement, especially concerning the 
preferred tactics for achieving fetal personhood and ending abortion. 
Chapter 5 looks at specific linguistic practices of the Personhood Movement in 
legislation and in the content of fetal personhood websites, utilizing legal and discourse 
analysis as tools to reveal that the representational and framing practices of the fetal 
Personhood Movement reflect an oversimplified view of the world expressed through 
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black and white position statements, efforts to ironize opposing viewpoints, and 
exclusions of factors that would indicate the existence of grey zones or the need for 
compromise. This analysis treats language as action to examine personhood’s strategic 
deployment of particular discursive techniques, with consideration given to how 
linguistic choices reciprocally constitute and reinforce the narrative frames of the 
movement and are integral to advocacy, praxis, and legislative efforts. I work from the 
assumption that language is dynamic and acts to structure worldview to investigate the 
construction of language for the movement.  Special attention is given to how accounts 
come to be represented as factual and how certain descriptions—such as that of the 
fetus—are reified, while others—such as that of the woman—are ironized. 
Chapter 6 pulls the legal analysis and the analysis of rhetoric together to make 
claims about the Personhood Movement and their use of language: how they impact 
legislation, how they impact the larger Pro-Life discourse, and the role they play in 
reconstituting the middle. I emphasize that the polarization and extreme rhetoric of the 
personhood paradigm erases the middle from the conversation and shifts the entire debate 
to be more in-line with conservative ideologies; this is a paradigm in which the woman is 
erased from the consideration linguistically and legally. Here, I discuss specific pro-life 
victories and question whether or not they would have been possible political landscape 
that did not elevate the position of the fetus at the expense of the woman carrying it—
suggesting this would not occur if women were re-centered in the conversation  I 
conclude by examining what can be done to bolster support of women’s autonomy, 
explaining the ways in which pro-life victories unevenly affect marginalized women, and 
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call on supporters of women’s freedoms to undermine the negative impact of the 
Personhood Movement on legislative action and socio-political discourse. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a critical analysis through an interpretive lens, using discourse and 
legal analysis as tools to examine the development of the language and representational 
practices of the Personhood Movement as situated within the mainstream Pro-Life effort. 
Specific attention paid to the rhetorical practices associated with their legislative goal of 
passing a Human Life Amendment. 
An Interpretive Lens 
Interpretive research design is admittedly non-linear. Instead, it is an iterative-
recursive process conceptualized as a hermeneutic circle where a researcher’s a priori 
knowledge and the information produced throughout the design and research process are 
part of “iterative sense making” (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, p. 56). As it is 
intricately linked with feminist methodologies, interpretive research entails engaging in 
constant reflexivity over the often-subtle intrusion of power hierarchies and hegemonies 
across domains studied and over one’s own role within said hierarchies (Ackerly & True, 
2010; 2013; Behl, 2016). Interpretive design asks us as researchers to critically reflect on 
extant categories, expands our understanding of what constitutes knowledge, and calls on 
us to bring to the forefront considerations of compassion and ethics (Ackerly & True, 
2010, 2013). It further understands knowledge production as abductive, emergent, and 
context-driven (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). It calls upon the researcher to be 
rigorously honest and “aware of the unconscious and/or unexamined assumptions that 
guide research and writing” (Townsend-Bell, 2009; p. 314). 
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I will unavoidably employ a frame myself as I cogenerate and interpret data 
throughout the research process: I am a research instrument (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 
2012; Charmaz, 2014). Furthermore, vision is always partial and “complete, all-
encompassing perception and descriptions are humanly impossible” (Schwartz-Shea & 
Yanow, 2012, p. 79). With this in mind, I have a responsibility to acknowledge the ways 
in which my belief systems and values will necessarily affect the knowledge I look for, 
produce, and relay. Furthermore, the intentions behind my research are shaped by my 
beliefs and values (Nagar and Geiger, 2007; Behl, forthcoming). As such, the following 
sections are intended to provide greater transparency regarding my research and design 
process, my scholastic influences, and my positionality as a researcher. My aim in 
expanding on this is to give the readers an opportunity to assess for themselves the 
trustworthiness of the knowledge claims I make (Shea & Yanow, 2012; Behl, 
forthcoming). 
Process, Data Generation, and Coding  
This research experience was hermeneutic, with the successive diameters 
shrinking, shifting, and focusing throughout the design, research, literature review, and 
drafting processes. This study is informed by a lifetime of conviction; three academic 
programs worth of knowledge, theories, and methodologies; years of research; and the 
often-brilliant scholarship of others. I clearly draw influence from my psychology 
training and believe that people act with motivation and intention. I further believe that 
the linguistic choices we make are powerful indicators of beliefs animating behaviors. 
Emily Wells (2012) explains “Language is action. Language is not only about things, it is 
used to do things” (p. 350). Description and categorization are powerful means of 
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accomplishing the action of language.  An important consideration here is that 
descriptions are useful not only in constructing an account as factual and true, but also 
capable of undermining competing descriptions (Johnston, 1995; Potter, 1996). Language 
as action is a central theme of discourse analysis and, as such, language is essentially 
treated as data points to be examined (Wells, 2012; Charmaz, 2014). Increasingly, 
language and the study of narrative and fact construction are gaining prominence in the 
fields of social psychology, sociology, and ethnography as a legitimate research tools 
(Johnston, 1995; Potter, 1996; McCaffrey& Keys, 2000; Hughes & Wyatt, 2009; Wilson, 
2011; Wells, 2012; Charmaz, 2014).  
This study keeps in mind interpretive methodologies and feminist sensibilities as 
it pulls from discourse and legal analysis to examine the frames used by the pro-fetal 
personhood faction of the Pro-Life Movement in their legislative efforts and direct 
communication. Data was co-generated from two major sites: 1.) Human Life 
Amendment-style legislation introduced at the state and federal level during two periods 
after the 1973 Supreme Court holdings in Roe v. Wade (1973), and 2.) materials 
personhood advocates provide to supporters to shape and frame the way they discuss 
issues of abortion, personhood, and legislation. 
Examples of federal legislation introduced into Congress during the 1970’s and 
1980’s were selected to serve as ‘model legislation’ (Appendix A). This time period was 
selected because it represented a diversity of tactics towards achieving a common goal 
during the period immediately following Roe v. Wade. One of the systems of coding 
looked at how these bills would achieve their end goals of attaining legal personhood 
status for embryos and proscribing abortion. The bills from the 1970’s and 1980’s can be 
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aggregated into seven major but, at times, overlapping categories based on how the bill 
works to promote the personhood agenda: (1) bills making abortion strictly state, rather 
than federal, domain, (2) bills containing verbiage redefining “person”, (3) bills 
containing verbiage redefining “life”, (4) bills reaffirming the state’s vested interest in 
unborn life, (5) bills prohibiting the state or states from depriving human life from the 
moment of conception, (6) bills stipulating the constitution does not protect abortion—
trying to undermine the penumbral logic of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe, and (7) 
bills containing provisions specifically prohibiting abortion. I do not mean to imply that 
the categories were fixed or static, or anything more than tools for organizing and 
thinking about the data. Rather, conceptualizing the legislation in this manner served as a 
baseline for an analysis of more recent federal and state efforts to enact personhood 
legislation from randomly selected texts of proposals from federal bills from 2003 until 
the present legislative session (Appendix B), as well as contemporary citizen initiatives 
and state legislation (Appendix C). Analyzing data from these three sets of proposed bills 
created an exposure which provided a strong representation of the Personhood 
Movement’s legislative efforts and ensured a robust offering of rhetorical tactics across 
time and geography. This mapping revealed tensions between legally symbolic and 
legally instrumental laws. Furthermore, it demonstrated the differing approaches between 
pro-life and pro-personhood factions in the Pro-Life Movement and made visible the 
relative strength of each faction.  
In analyzing the legal data set, laws were subject to multiple coding schemes. For 
the chapter on personhood in law, a main question was enforceability as well as if there 
was an actor upon whom this law could be enforced. To this end, bills were coded as 
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legally symbolic or legally instrumental. Essentially, I asked, could the bill be enforced as 
written, or would its enforcement require additional legislation? Would the bill succeed 
in establishing personhood and ending abortion, or was more legislation required to 
bolster the bill under consideration? A bill such as the Paramount Amendment, which 
reaffirms the paramount right to life vested in each human from conception on, would be 
coded as legally symbolic because it lacks enforceability, the ability to end abortion, or 
the language required to establish legal personhood. Coding a bill as legally symbolic as 
opposed to legally instrumental does not mean that a bill cannot have an instrumental 
effect in how we conceptualize start of life and abortion—my belief is that these bills 
greatest success is their unintended instrumental shift, or reconstitution, of what is 
considered the middle ground in the American abortion political landscape. 
Additionally, each bill was coded for the actors involved: federal government, 
state government, women, private individuals, fetuses, God—although in the case of 
women, they were often coded as “omitted,” or not involved. Bills making note of the 
fetal/female relationship were also coded for later analysis. Bills were coded as 
containing no exemptions or containing exemptions, with sub-codes based on what type 
of exemption was allowed for. If bills specifically mentioned miscarriage, abortion, in 
vitro fertilization, or birth control, that was also noted for consideration in the analysis.  
After initial coding was complete, I turned to a closer examination of the differences 
between and within codes. For example, what additional coding occurred or disappeared 
with the shift in name from “Right to Life Act” to “Life at Conception Act,” and what 
were the rhetorical purposes that could motivate this change? Similarly, what claims 
could be explored about a data set that largely omitted the woman entirely or mentioned 
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her only in the role of mother, or someone upon whom the “unborn” experiences a 
“condition of dependency?” (For a demonstration of coding method developed for federal 
and state legislation, please see Appendices E and F.) 
A second data set includes “how to” guides and other texts designed to alter the 
way supporters verbally advocate their stance, supplied by pro-personhood organizations. 
Examples include guides on how to change the language used to speak about abortion 
and personhood, position statements, and tips on talking to your congressman available 
on pro-personhood websites (Appendix D). The analysis involved a detailed reading and 
coding of all texts designed to create an intertextual dialog among the sources of data. 
(Lofland, 2006; Shea & Yanow, 2012). All texts were considered potential data points 
with a mindfulness towards understanding significance for the goals of the movement and 
the significance for the legal status of abortion, the fetus, and women as autonomous 
human beings. Coding was an iterative recursive process. The extant literature alerted me 
to themes to be attentive to, such as the presence of quasi-feminist or religiously charged 
language, and to possible coding schemes. However, the main factor influencing the 
coding was the language of the bills and the web texts included in the data sets. For 
example, it wasn’t until I read “7 Ways to Change How You Speak about Abortion” 
(Harold, 2014) that it occurred to me to go back through all my source texts and code for 
whether or not the text applied a gender to the fetus. 
Coding schemes were developed to address the treatment of the fetus—as a child, 
as a citizen, as a dependent—and treatment of the pregnant woman—as a mother, as a 
woman, or as omitted entirely. Additional coding emerged through close readings and 
analysis of the texts concerned exemptions, invocation of legality, science (invoking or 
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belittling), the language of war and violence, oversimplification, and mention of 
technology (Appendix G). Often times a code became an umbrella code that was 
subsequently disaggregated into more nuanced ideas, or a combination of codes were 
better understood in relation to one another. For example, oversimplification as a code 
can be further divided into sub-codes including “Absolutism,” “If/Then statements,” 
“Either/Or Statements,” “Removing the middle,” “Specious comparisons”, and “Thou 
Shall Nots” (please see Appendix H for a selection of the “Oversimplification” coding 
umbrella). All texts were read and coded manually (for a digitized example of this 
process, see Appendix I) before coding data was electronically sorted. Coding in this 
manner enabled the analysis process to have greater fluidity in the application of labels 
and more appropriately reflect patterns of omission and exclusion, repetitions, either/or 
belief structures and labeling, to make visible part of the frame employed by the 
personhood faction of the Pro-Life Movement. 
Influences and Assumptions 
Framing analysis and interpretive design both desire to understand taken for 
granted meanings (Johnston, 1995; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012).  Pro-life discourse 
in America is largely driven to affect legislative change (Sauette and Gordon, 2013). 
However, this is not the only significance of the discourse surrounding abortion rights 
and fetal personhood. Macro-discourse analysis and micro-discourse analysis of social 
movement texts—including readings aiming to comprehend the tacit understandings of 
the how and why behind social movement communications—allows for a dimensional 
mapping (Johnston, 1995). Furthermore, a recognition that there exists “a public-private 
continuum in which the audience and the scope of diffusion are important determinants 
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of what gets said” helps to develop a more nuanced recognition of pragmatic intent 
(Johnston, 1995, p. 223). 
Footing and stake are important to any discussion of framing (Johnston, 1995; 
Potter, 1996). Footing concerns the relationship an activist has to the discourse in 
question and the distance that activist has from stakes in the discourse. Stake is the level 
of investment or interest in a discourse. Stake inoculation is a process whereby an activist 
deliberately crafts a discourse with descriptions intended to control or moderate 
perceptions of stake in the discourse in order to appear to approach from a position of 
neutrality. The processes through which accounts and aspects of discourse are selectively 
reified or ironized contribute to footing, stake, and interest management. To reify 
something is to regard it as true and valid; ironizing something is a manner of rejection 
through the questioning of veracity. Related to this is the concept of nominalization. On 
its face, nominalization is a technique that allows the activist to demonstrate neutrality; 
however, nominalization can be a powerful tool for obfuscation (Potter, 1996). 
Equally important as what is said in a particular discourse is what is not said. As 
Potter explains: 
 One of the aspects of making any description is that it will pick out a 
particular range of phenomena as relevant and ignore other potential ones. 
This is the extended sense of ontological gerrymandering; one realm of 
entities is constituted in the descriptions while another is avoided (1996: p. 
184). 
The language that is not used is every bit as important as the language that is used 
because complex sets of motivations and considerations are bound up in these decisions. 
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In producing an account and trying to represent it as factual, correctly applying 
motivation and intent through psychological use of language can assist in legitimizing an 
account. 
Positionality and Intentionality 
The irony of a pro-woman, pro-autonomy feminist in a Social Justice and Human 
Rights program writing a paper on framing in the Pro-Life and fetal Personhood 
Movements is not lost on me. It would be dishonest to attempt to downplay my position 
and beliefs. Instead, I seek to be transparent about certain ‘ground rules’ I set for myself 
and endeavored to observe. I had to be particularly attuned to the possibility of distortions 
in my perception or interpretations (Lofland, 2006). I had to be discerning in my analysis 
to guard against “structuring attention” or “seeing only those things that are consistent 
with one’s assumptions and propositions” (Lofland, 2006).  
This process also required making decisions regarding the use of language. 
Narrative and labels play a large role in abortion legislation and activism (Madrazo, 
2014)—it would be foolish of me not to recognize my research as a potential piece of 
activism. Whether I used the phrase “pro-life” or “anti-choice” mattered. Whether I used 
the phrase “unborn,” “fetus,” “zygote,” “preborn child,” etc. definitely mattered. I aimed 
to balance respect for the opinions of those in support of fetal personhood with respect 
for my convictions. At the same time, this is not to say that I held all views in an equal 
light, only that I strived to fairly evaluate all views. 
In discussing issues surrounding abortion, a mistake both sides make is failing to 
give proper attention to what the other side believes (Sanger, 2012a). It is therefore 
important that I acknowledge the arguments put forward by abortion opponents that 
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“Abortion ends the life of a living human embryo or fetus. Plainly, abortion kills a living 
being” (Paulsen, 2005, p. 196, emphasis original) and that life starts from the moment of 
fertilization and is deserving of protection during all stages of gestation. An appropriately 
nuanced discussion of the moral, biological, and philosophical arguments of this debate is 
beyond the scope of this research project—however, I still have an obligation to treat 
their view on the sanctity of life with due respect and understand it to be a belief held as 
sincerely as I hold my own.  
The Pro-Life Movement is smart, strategic, clever, and highly dedicated to their 
cause. It is a mistake to simply dismiss the continued efforts of the Personhood 
Movement as “the definition of insanity.” I worked from the basic assumption that there 
is a reason, multiple reasons even, why the Personhood Movement persists in what 
appears to be a losing legal battle. At the forefront of my mind during analysis was a keen 
awareness that these groups are not crazy—they are purposeful. I endeavored to develop 
a deeper understanding of the relationship between narrative, law, and practice in the 
discursive and framing tactics of the fetal Personhood Movement juxtaposed to those of 
the mainstream Pro-Life Movement. 
This was not intended as a piece of “gotcha” activism. I only used quotes pulled 
from websites where the individuals spoke on the record. Most materials were pulled 
directly from organizations’ websites or recorded interviews. The integrity of quotes and 
context—specifically, adequate context—was maintained. Anything that appears between 
quotation marks in this paper is pulled directly from such materials. It was critical to me 
that I present the Personhood Movement using their own words. That being said, the 
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interpretation is mine—I strived to compose a trustworthy analysis and a convincing 
argument, free of distortions. 
  26 
CHAPTER 3 
THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONHOOD 
While the notion of fetal personhood was conceived prior to Roe v. Wade (1973), 
the Supreme Court hearings and subsequent publication of majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions mark when the idea fully implanted.  Perhaps one of the most 
ominous moments of the oral argument came when Justice Byron R. White asked Sarah 
Weddington, the attorney for Roe, “is it critical to your case that the fetus not to be a 
person under the due process clause?... would you lose your case if the fetus was a 
person?” (1972, 14:30-16:45). The state of Texas argued before the court that they had a 
legitimate interest in protecting prenatal life, and some amici briefs filed with the court 
supported the notion that human life begins at the moment of conception. The court 
rejected this notion in the majority opinion, unequivocally stating that the word ‘person’ 
in the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to encompass the unborn. 
Yet, supporters of fetal personhood still turn to the word “person” in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment. Personhood organizations seek to reclassify when life begins 
from a legal standpoint by drafting and supporting laws which grant zygotes and fetuses 
full legal protection—independent of the woman carrying the fetus—from the moment of 
conception and at all phases of development. The driving logic is the belief that 
redefining personhood would guarantee the fetus privileges and immunities that could not 
be abridged without due process. Essentially, they seek to guarantee a fetus full rights and 
protections—potentially even greater rights and protections than that afforded to the 
woman carrying the fetus. 
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For this study, all legislation examined fell into the category of Human Life 
Amendments, at the state or federal level, supported by the Personhood Movement. 
Although a Human Life Amendment has failed to pass, their introduction into the 
national conversation is resulting in incremental success for the mainstream Pro-Life 
Movement (Pattinson, 2013). I contend one of the most significant contributions of the 
Personhood Movement is how their extreme, no compromise position has reconstituted 
the middle ground. A significant effect of personhood rhetoric is that it humanizes the 
fetus and shapes an environment in which deprivations of women’s rights in the name of 
the fetus is considered acceptable.  
This chapter is intended to outline the contours of the personhood faction of the 
Pro-Life Movement. By explicating the distinction between incremental and immediate 
strategies and providing an overview of the efforts towards passing a Human Life 
Amendment, I make visible a division in the movement. This schism is important 
because it demonstrates the fact that the Pro-Life Movement is not a homogenous, 
monolithic entity. Understanding this divide elucidates the manner in which the extreme 
rhetoric and legislative efforts of the Personhood Movement act to normalize damaging 
bills proposed by the mainstream Pro-Life Movement and draws attention to the reality 
that, while these two factions may engage in verbal sparring, their strategies work in 
conjunction. 
Incremental and Immediate Strategies 
In an attempt to undermine a woman’s right to an abortion protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, pro-life activists have effectively utilized legislative efforts. A 
Guttmacher Institute report found that in the first few months of 2017 state legislatures 
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introduced 1,053 bills regulating reproductive health: 431 restricting access to abortion-
related services (Nash, Gold, Ansari-Thomas, Capello & Mohammed, 2017). The vast 
majority of these efforts fall under the umbrella of incremental tactics (most frequently 
applied by the mainstream Pro-Life Movement), while a considerably smaller number fall 
under the umbrella of immediate approach tactics (such as Human Life Amendments, 
favored by the Personhood Movement, and the focus of the present study). This section 
provides greater detail on incremental and immediate strategies, the faction of the 
movement they are favored by, and criticisms of each. 
Incremental tactics slowly chip away at or erode abortion rights, immediate tactics 
would outlaw abortion in one fell swoop. Some in the movement discuss these tactics as 
if they fall into two different taxonomies, others reject this dichotomy and view the 
approaches as falling along a continuum. Jay Rogers (2014), writing on behalf of 
Personhood Alliance recognizes six levels of strategy: (1) a compromised incrementalism 
strategy, (2) principled incrementalism, (3) personhood compliant laws that do not 
specifically proscribe abortion but achieve similar effects, (4) personhood compliant laws 
that redefine personhood through legislation, (5) abortion bans without exception, and (6) 
a constitutional redefinition of personhood. Abortion bans that include exceptions for the 
life or health of the mother and cases of rape or incest are classified as compromised 
incrementalism. The term principled incrementalism encompasses laws which have 
language making abortion more onerous to obtain but do not outright proscribe abortion 
or contain explicit exceptions—for example, parental notification and mandatory 
ultrasound laws. In this frame, one law could do considerably more than another to curtail 
the number of abortions but be viewed as compromised rather than principled. 
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The incremental approach towards eroding the right to an abortion and 
establishing fetal rights through personhood compliant laws, the main strategy of the 
mainstream Pro-Life Movement, has been quite successful, as can be seen by: fetal 
protection laws (Daniels 1993; Duden, 1993; Henricks, 2015; Johnsen, 1986; Krauss, 
1991), feticide laws (Crist, 2010; Daniels, 1993; Schroedel, 2000), stillborn birth 
certificates (Sanger, 2012b), informed consent laws (Seigel, 2008; Daniels, Ferguson, 
Howard, & Roberti., 2016), mandatory waiting periods (Daniels, Ferguson, Howard, & 
Roberti, 2016), lawyer ad litem for fetuses (Oaks, 2000), and even more restrictions. 
These laws often work to reclassify the fetus as a person, not in constitutional law, but in 
other areas of law such as criminal or inheritance law. The reclassification achieved 
through these laws aids in shaping public opinion, enabling legislators to continue 
passing laws which make abortions more onerous to perform or obtain. Table 1 (next 
page) provides a mapping of the Personhood Faction and mainstream Pro-Life 
Movement, looking at major players within each faction and some of the tactics they 
deploy towards achieving their ultimate goals. 
There are those within the Personhood Movement, such as Matt Sande of Pro-Life 
Wisconsin, who believe that the “incremental approach is not working — the number of 
abortions is climbing over time.” He continues, “we need to end this. We need to end 
surgical abortion, without exception, without compromise, without apology” (Wyler, 
2013). In this view, any compromise, even for life and health of the mother, is hypocrisy, 
capitulation, and logically and morally inconsistent (Personhood Alliance, n.d.; Muise, 
2014; People for the American Way, 2014; Rogers, 2014; Cohen, 2015; Right Wing 
Watch Staff, 2015). Robert Muise (2014) expresses weariness with the incrementalist 
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approach, saying that, while it has laudable goals, it has lost sight of the larger picture 
and “offers no plan or promise of ending abortion in the foreseeable future.” While 
Rogers (2014) attempts to downplay the division caused by the difference of tactics, 
Muise (2014) does not mince words when he states “[If] the American public is not ready 
to accept the reality that human life begins at fertilization…then it is a serious indictment 
of the national pro-life movement and calls into question its efficacy over the years.” Pro-
life critics of the incremental approach often support immediate strategies, such as a 
Human Life Amendment to the federal Constitution or state level amendments.   
 
Table 1  
Mapping of Personhood Faction and Mainstream Pro-Life Movement 
Faction Personhood Mainstream Pro-Life 
Who? Personhood Alliance 
American Life League 
National Right to Life Committee 
Americans United for Life 
What? End abortion and establish 
fetal personhood immediately 
Erode the right to an abortion and establish 
indices of fetal personhood 
How? Human Life Amendment 
• State level 
• Federal level 
Incremental approaches at state and federal 
level, such as: 
• Fetal protection laws  
• Feticide laws 
• Stillborn birth certificates 
• Chemical endangerment laws 
• Informed consent  
• Mandatory waiting periods 
• Mandatory ultrasounds 
• Lawyer ad litem for fetuses 
• Withholding and restricting funding  
• Indices of personhood in inheritance 
law, etc. 
 
  31 
Human Life Amendments: An Overview 
Proponents of an immediate approach—such as the Personhood Movement—
frequently channel their energies towards the passage of a Human Life Amendment.  Yet, 
even within an immediate strategy, the proposed laws a number of different tactics. This 
section is merely intended to provide a reasonable overview of the effort to enact a 
Human Life Amendment, a detailed discussion of proposed amendments is included in 
Chapter 4. However, it is useful to introduce the topic here, as it represents a point of 
contention in the Pro-Life Movement and serves to demonstrate the schism created by the 
issue of personhood. 
The first Human Life Amendment was proposed just one week after the 
announcement of the holding in Roe v. Wade (1973). Maryland Representative Lawrence 
Hogan (R) introduced House Joint Resolution 261 which read:   
Section 1. Neither the United States nor any State shall deprive any human 
being, from the moment of conception, of life without due process of law; 
nor deny to any human being, from the moment of conception, within its 
jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Neither the United States nor any State shall deprive any human 
being of life on account of illness, age, or incapacity. 
Section 3. Congress and the several States shall have the power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation. 
The next introduction of a federal bill came in March of the same year and is more 
explicit in its purpose and aim—limiting abortion. Commonly referred to as the 
Whitehurst Amendment, House Joint Resolution 427 simply reads “Nothing in this 
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Constitution shall bar any State or territory or the District of Columbia, with regard to 
any area over which it has jurisdiction, from allowing, regulating, or prohibiting the 
practice of abortion.” 
 Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, there was a large quantity of Human Life 
Amendments introduced. To date, the only one to advance to a vote is the 1983 “Hatch-
Eagleton Amendment,” Senate Joint Resolution 3 (SJR 3). Comprised of a mere ten 
words: “A right to abortion is not secured by this constitution,” SJR 3 made it through 
committee and came before the full Senate but fell well short of the 67 votes required to 
send the amendment to the House, with a vote tally of 49-50.   
While the introduction of these bills never went away, the 1990’s and early 
2000’s were defined mostly by their successes in the incremental push. Then, beginning 
in the mid-2000’s and early 2010’s there was a marked increase in the number of State 
level personhood initiatives, spearheaded by states like Colorado and Mississippi. 
Colorado’s people-lead initiative, Amendment 48, went before voters in 2008. The text 
read “As used in section 3, 6, and 25 of Article II of the state constitution, the term 
‘person’ or ‘persons’ shall include any human being from the moment of fertilization.” 
The citizens of Colorado voted against Amendment 48—73.21% to 26.79%. 
Mississippi’s 2011 Initiative 26, also called the Life Begins at the Moment of 
Fertilization Amendment, offered the next major test of the personhood agenda. As 
Mississippi is a historically and reliably conservative state, many supporters of 
personhood viewed this as a pivotal test—one they felt assured they could succeed in. 
The plain language of the ballot read: 
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Initiative #26 would amend the Mississippi Constitution to define the word 
‘person’ or ‘persons,’ as those terms are used in Article III of the state 
constitution, to include every human being from the moment of 
fertilization, cloning, or the functional equivalent thereof. 
In a shocking turn of events, Mississippi voters rejected the initiative 57.63% to 42.37%. 
Still, the movement was not deterred. Supporters of the Mississippi initiative 
regrouped; in October 2014, Personhood USA rebranded as Personhood Alliance and 
held its founding convention. Calling personhood “the pro-life battle-ground of the 21st 
century,” the Personhood Alliance (2014) believes that groups like National Right to Life 
Committee (NRLC) and Americans United for Life (AUL) have strayed from the 
Christian origins of the movement and made an egregious mistake in their willingness to 
compromise1 in order to appeal to the mainstream. Personhood Alliance contends: 
Our narrow focus on being anti-abortion in the 20th century has not 
expanded, at a grassroots level, to embrace a host of issues which are 
emerging in the 21st century. We need to adjust our strategy and message 
to one of Personhood, in order to successfully transition our base 
(Personhood Alliance, 2014) 
In this vein the Personhood Movement has increased their efforts at the state and 
municipal level, working to change local politics. In addition to the activism in Colorado 
and Mississippi, more than eleven other states have introduced fetal personhood bills—
including Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina, and Texas. In 
                                                 
1 Paul Brown, speaking at the Personhood Alliance founding convention, went as far as to question whether 
these groups have a financial motivation not to succeed in completely eliminating abortion (Right Wing 
Watch, Staff, 2015). 
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Alabama, the legislatures have passed a bill to allow voters to have the final say on fetal 
personhood when they go to the polls in November of 2018 (Nash et al., 2017). 
Additionally, South Carolina (Lewis, 2016), Michigan (Al-Sibai, 2017; ProPublica, n.d.), 
North Dakota (Culp-Ressler, 2015), and Wisconsin (ProPublica, n.d.), have all had 
particularly active personhood movements in recent years.  
However, not everyone in the Pro-Life Movement is keen on the notion of 
personhood. The following section contours the schism within the movement caused by 
the work of the personhood faction. Mapping and understanding this conflict is 
significant because it represents an opportunity for activists on multiple sides of the 
debate. Activists and supporters of the personhood agenda reconstitute the middle 
through their extreme rhetoric, allowing supporters of the mainstream pro-life agenda to 
appear reasonable and placing them in a better position from which to negotiate. Finally, 
supporters of the choice agenda and women’s autonomy need to understand the schism in 
order to more successfully undermine the influence of personhood and pro-life rhetoric 
on the national stage in order re-center the woman in the debate. 
A Schism in the Movement 
Even pro-life legal scholars dispute the prudence of supporting a Human Life 
Amendment, especially one approved by a state referendum, due to foreseeable risks. 
One oft-sighted risk is that a human life amendment is not self-enforcing, and without 
substantial backing in federal courts, it could have the actual result of presenting greater 
challenges for the pro-life agenda while garnering considerable negative media coverage 
and precluding compromise (Forsythe & Burke, 2007; Linton, 2009).  
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There is considerable concern about what a significant loss on a Human Life 
Amendment would mean for the future of the pro-life legislative agenda, as well as what 
the ramifications would be for the movement if a blatantly unconstitutional law were 
struck down by the courts (Forsythe & Burke, 2007; Linton, 2009; Linton, 2015). This 
sentiment is echoed in the warning: “there is no such thing as a "no-cost" defeat” (Linton, 
2009, p. 61). Recognizing the frustration built up in the years since Roe v. Wade, these 
scholars call on pro-life supporters to avoid acting rashly and impulsively, and to, instead, 
act in a manner which progresses the movement in more certain and secure ways.  
Given this position, some scholars offer a stinging rebuke of the Personhood 
Movement and proposed personhood amendments at the state level. They outline 
limitations of such proposals, including: “failure to recognize the hierarchy of law” 
(Linton, 2009, p. 62), confounding state action with private action, and failure to frame 
the proposed laws as mandates rather than prohibitions. Scholars are equally critical of 
efforts to push personhood legislation at a local or municipal level, noting the difficulty 
of citizen initiatives in most municipalities—state law may even pre-empt municipal 
regulations of abortion or definitions of life—and that, even if a local area decided to 
redefine ‘person’ its effect would be limited geographically (Linton, 2009; 2015). Citing 
the Personhood Movements lack of willingness to compromise, Paul Linton contends 
“the local citizens initiative strategy adopted by Personhood Alliance does not deserve 
the support of the pro-life community” (2015, p. 33, emphasis mine).  
There are also scholars who contend anyone (critic or supporter) who claims a 
Human Life Amendment would ban abortion are disingenuous; they claim these laws do 
not function as suggested due to the many different versions of Human Life Amendment, 
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the importance of due process (with due process, abortion might still be permissible), the 
distinction between state and federal law, as well as the distinction between criminal and 
constitutional law (Forsythe, 1996). Others are less charitable in their assessment, 
asserting that Human Life Amendments, especially at the level of state, are “blanks” 
rather than “silver bullets,” and will do nothing to end abortion; Linton bluntly states: 
“these proposals, in my judgment, have been drafted with breathtaking, indeed, stunning, 
ignorance, or even defiance, of basic state and federal constitutional principles” (2009, p. 
62). 
The debate over a Human Life Amendment is a point of contention among pro-
life activists and there is a polarization over questions of compromise. This causes some 
in the mainstream Pro-Life Movement to distance themselves—one such activist is Sue 
Armacost of Wisconsin Right to Life who is on record stating “I don’t want to talk about 
the personhood amendment anymore. I’m done talking about the personhood amendment. 
This particular measure might sound good from a pro-life perspective, but it’s not going 
to save one single life” (Right Wing Watch, 2015). Others, such as Charmain Yoest of 
Americans United for Life, a mainstream group frequently criticized by members and 
organizations within the Personhood Movement, acknowledge the impact of the 
Personhood Movement: “The pro-life movement is not one size fits all. Most people want 
to see abortion restricted in some way, even if they don’t call themselves pro-life … 
We’re the ones occupying the middle ground” (Wyler, 2013). The Pro-Life Movements 
awareness of this allows them to maintain a façade of reason as they bargain from footing 
artificially modified by the extremity of personhood rhetoric. The subsequent sections 
examine how personhood laws and discourse facilitate this shift. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RECONSTITUTING THE MIDDLE THROUGH LEGISLATION 
Analysis of tactics deployed for proposed Human Life legislation across time, 
geography, and jurisdiction illuminates conflicts between state and federal powers to 
regulate or proscribe abortion and demonstrates the comparative power of the Pro-Life 
and Personhood Movements. Human Life legislation in the ten years post-Roe forged the 
path for today’s Personhood Movement, which has narrowed its scope considerably in 
terms of federal legislation. The states are a slightly different matter. The Personhood 
Movement is strong in some, but not all, states and its strength has been overestimated in 
certain pro-life strongholds. Variations—observed in bill texts from federal to state, 
across states, and even within states—reveal the tension between a pro-life agenda 
seeking a mainstream appeal, and the personhood agenda which views compromise and 
exemptions to be hypocrisy and the moral equivalent of the murder of innocent life.  
 The legal ramifications of Roe v. Wade were immediate. In the decade after the 
decision, both chambers of Congress endeavored to pass bills that fall under the umbrella 
of Human Life Amendments. Efforts to pass a Human Life Amendment continue to the 
present day at the state and federal level. While in the ten years immediately following 
Roe, Congress deployed a range of tactical approaches attempting to proscribe abortion 
and establish a Human Life Amendment, the modern day legislative efforts have focused 
considerably. The language of the federal level bills examined in this study was nearly 
identical from 2003 until 2017 across the House of Representatives and the Senate2.  
                                                 
2 There are a few reasons for the similarity of language across time and chambers. First, bills are frequently 
reintroduced in subsequent sessions if they have not received a hearing during the legislative session in 
which they are initially proposed. Each year the bill simply received a new numeric designation and may 
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If the first ten years of the effort to pass a federal Human Life Amendment is 
characterized by a variety of strategies, and the contemporary federal movement has been 
more focused, recent state actions have simultaneously narrowed in focus and expanded 
in tactics. To clarify, the text of state efforts generally include language redefining person 
and specifying the start of life, as well as containing provisions explicitly prohibiting 
abortions, but the mechanisms of the state efforts and the actions they call for are 
considerably more varied. Some states try to establish personhood and end abortion 
through citizen-led initiatives, others have drafted legislation amending the state 
constitution by adding sections and redefining life. Still, others have crafted bills striking 
the language of abortion from their revised statutes. One of the states in the sample, 
Texas, called upon the federal government to draft a Human Life Amendment to ban 
abortion and provided potential model legislation for Congress.  
When examining state legislation, one thing becomes clear: the states are ground 
zero in the tension between personhood and the Pro-Life Movement. The texts of these 
bills and the pattern of introduction—sometimes multiple, near-identical bills in the same 
session—demonstrate the level of disagreement over what such a bill should look like 
and what, if any, exceptions it should allow for.  
While these bills may have different approaches toward the same goal, close 
reading reveals they share a common trait in that they all fail to live up to their promises. 
In some instances, the bills are not written in a manner to be enforceable. In other bills, 
                                                 
shuffle sponsors or co-sponsors. Second, bills in Congress must go through a reconciliation process after 
being passed in the House and Senate—this is simpler to accomplish if the bills are similar or the same. 
Finally, often bills proposed are based on model legislation provided by organizations mobilizing on behalf 
of a particular legislative goal. Recent federal legislation exemplifies a strong model of a basic template 
that reflects modifications in response to constituent concerns and criticisms of the bill. 
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the language is so fluid it could have the opposite effect of that intended. Some of the 
bills provide exemptions that are inconsistent with the beliefs of the Personhood 
Movement, while others contain so few exemptions they would require a serious (yet 
absent) balancing of interests with the rights of the pregnant woman.  
In this chapter, I use the texts of Human Life Amendments to explain and 
demonstrate that, while the personhood faction favors an immediate approach, 
personhood laws tend to be more symbolic than legally instrumental. An overarching 
question that must be asked of all these bills is: would they actually work? Would any of 
these bills achieve their goal if they were enacted? I argue the short answer is no, but this 
is not to say they would not have any effect. I contend that the value of the movement 
introducing personhood compliant laws, even if they fail to pass, is that, as an immediate 
strategy, they are often quite extreme—this works to reconstitute the middle because it 
makes incremental laws appear more reasonable, allowing for true instrumental gains. In 
this manner, the mainstream Pro-Life Movement benefits from the discourse of 
personhood. I begin by addressing enforceability and identify this as an indicator of 
whether a proposed Human Life Amendment should be considered legally symbolic or 
instrumental. Next, I look at exemptions as an example of a tactic used to boost 
mainstream appeal and juxtapose it with purist personhood legislation. Here, I turn to 
state bills as exemplars of more traditional personhood rhetoric. Through an examination 
of the language of the bills and the tactics they deploy towards attaining fetal personhood, 
I make visible the influence of Personhood’s religious ideologies, a simplistic, “see no, 
speak no, hear no evil” mentality, and a shift towards polarization in personhood 
legislation. I conclude by arguing that these tactics are symbolic, but their extreme nature 
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works to reconstitute the middle of the abortion political landscape, allowing both 
socially and legally instrumental gains to be made by the mainstream Pro-Life 
Movement, who pursue incremental tactics and victories in other domains of law.  
Enforceability: What Makes a Bill Symbolic Rather than Instrumental? 
Enforceability is a critical (but not the only) consideration of what makes a bill 
symbolic or instrumental. Detailed attention to the bills in this study makes clear that 
most regulate state behavior, not the behavior of private individuals. States do not run 
abortion clinics or provide abortions—individual citizens do. This conundrum gets to the 
issue of enforceability that is a central question to most of the proposals. Bills not written 
in a manner that would touch private behavior are more emblematic than legally 
instrumental.  
Many bills appeared so toothless they surely must be symbolic—but symbolism is 
important and conveys great meaning. Take, for example, House Joint Resolution 294 
(1979), referred to as the Paramount Amendment, which states: “The paramount right to 
life is vested in each human being from the moment of fertilization without regard to age, 
health, or condition of dependency.” There is an incredible amount packed into that 
twenty-five-word sentence, but one of the main things it does is communicate to pro-life, 
pro-personhood constituents that the legislature hears their concerns, understand their 
concerns, and will be their voice as well as the voice of ‘the unborn and pre-born.’ It does 
not matter to proponents of personhood that this law is unenforceable; a symbolic legal 
victory is significant in and of itself. 
Even if a bill is written in a manner to make it enforceable, this does not 
guarantee it will achieve its stated purpose: for example, House Joint Resolution 427 
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(1973), the Whitehurst Amendment. This bill, similar to the proposed Scott Amendment 
(Senate Joint Resolution 91, 1975), is classified as a Human Life legislation despite not 
containing a definition of life. These bills seem specifically written with the intent to 
upend Roe and work by turning over the power to regulate or proscribe abortion to the 
states. The plain language of the text does not explicitly ban abortion and would not 
necessarily end abortion. Instead, it would make this decision the domain of the state. 
Notably, in both of these bills as well as the Noonan Amendment (House Joint 
Resolution 681), states could decide to allow abortion or liberalize existing restrictions. A 
state legislature could still pass laws stipulating cases in which abortions were 
permitted—or decline to regulate them entirely. All this bill does is decree that abortion 
is not a right guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Each of the fifty states has a 
constitution of their own and can write laws of their choosing, provided the laws do not 
violate the federal Constitution. What is almost certain is that this could create an even 
more polarized and piecemeal availability of abortion care dependent upon where a 
woman was located geographically, which in turn disproportionately affects marginalized 
women (Jones, Ingerick, & Jerman, 2018).  
Furthermore, the text of all of these bills neglect the reality that the constitution 
does not guarantee life—it guarantees the state will not deprive a person of life without 
due process. These bills do not provide a ban. Absent a ban or additional laws regulating 
individual behavior, the proposed amendment only makes symbolic gains towards 
eliminating abortion or achieving personhood.  
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Mainstream Appeal versus Personhood Compliance 
A main point of contention between the personhood faction and the larger Pro-
Life Movement surrounds language of exemptions in bills sponsored by mainstream pro-
life groups. Human Life Amendments containing exemptions—such as ones for the life 
of the mother, rape, or incest—are generally supported by mainstream pro-life groups, 
but not the personhood faction. Bills often contain exemptions to boost popular appeal 
and make the deprivation of liberties more palatable to voting constituents, this is 
particularly true of bills introduced at the federal level. 
For example, the Roncallo Amendment, 1974’s House Joint Resolution 1041, is 
written in such a way that it redefines personhood and bans abortion, but it also appears 
to be written in a way that would not impact in vitro fertilization or other fertility 
treatments, which do not intentionally destroy human life. Similarly, the 2017 Senate 
version of the Life at Conception Act (S. 231) maintains the quasi-feminist language of 
the previous version, and adds protections for in vitro fertilization, birth control, and 
fertility treatment with the language: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require 
the prosecution of any woman for the death of her unborn child, a prohibition on in vitro 
fertilization, or a prohibition on use of birth control or another means of preventing 
fertilization.” These exemptions make the bills safer for the sponsors and co-sponsors and 
better reflect the way most American’s feel about abortion, birth control, and fertility 
treatment. While these exemptions are in-line with the majority of Americans and the 
mainstream Pro-Life Movement, they contradict the desires and rhetoric of the more 
radical Personhood Movement. This is a logical inconsistency which would infuriate the 
purists of the Personhood Movement because the law treats all life as sacred from the 
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moment of conception—but only so far as abortion is concerned. True believers of the 
Personhood Movement would not approve of a law that would allow fertilized embryos 
(such as those created during the in vitro process) to exist in limbo. 
 Owing to the difficulties of passing a Human Life Amendment at the federal 
level, organizations leading the push for fetal personhood have turned to the states as 
their primary battlegrounds. A common theme in the state bills examined was a tension 
between state’s powers to protect unborn life or ban abortion and extant federal 
law/Supreme Court jurisprudence. This frustration was expressed by the states in 
different ways. Some states, such as South Carolina and Kansas explicitly included 
language evoking the right of the state to offer protections above what is called for by the 
federal constitution. Kansas’ Senate Concurrent Resolution 1607 and House Concurrent 
Resolution 5009 include the language “Recognizing the authority of the state of Kansas 
to exercise its police power and…sovereign right to adopt individual liberties…more 
expansive than those conferred by the constitution of the United States.” Kansas 
additionally attempted to capitalize on public shame by calling attention to “the current 
federally mandated legal status of preborn humans.” Some states express concern about 
their relative level of sovereignty through their actions to protect the bill in the event that 
it does pass. Iowa’s House File 297 and Senate File 253 are identical bills relevant to the 
discussion of state compared to federal authority because they contain two sections 
discussing jurisdictional and legality concerns, such as a severability clause inoculating 
the bill should portions of it be rendered invalid or challenged in court.  
What may seem like a collection of small turn of phrases are significant because 
they exemplify the disgust and frustration felt by many in the Personhood Movement 
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towards the government for its failure to overturn Roe v. Wade and pass a Human Life 
Amendment. This frustration, like a seething resentment, is starting to bubble out of the 
hidden transcripts of personhood discourse and into the more public transcript of 
legislative discourse in this country (Scott, 1990). While much of the past legislation has 
been virtually unenforceable, the rhetoric of personhood has damaging consequences and 
shows no signs of abating. In addition to the tension over jurisdiction, state legislation 
makes visible the effect of personhood lobbying and discourse. State bills contain strong 
evidence for the influence of religious ideologies, a simplistic, “see no, speak no, hear 
no” evil mentality, and a shift towards polarization.  These symbolic tactics have little to 
no instrumental value save how their extreme nature works to reconstitute the middle in 
the abortion political landscape. The following subsections examine each of these themes 
in greater detail before explicating the damaged caused by proposed Human Life 
Amendments—even failed ones—namely, these proposals allow for greater success of 
dangerous, mainstream pro-life legislation. 
Personhood: Religious ideologies. While many pro-life individuals have 
religious motivations undergirding their views on abortion and fetal personhood, the 
blatant use of religious imagery reflects the desires of the Personhood Movement and 
their attempt to transition their base and protect “human dignity.” For example, National 
Personhood Alliance is openly faith-based and, in their Founding Charter, call for a 
return to the biblical understanding of personhood. The introduction of highly charged 
religious language into Bill 217 of the South Carolina General Assembly, the 
‘Personhood Act of South Carolina,’ indicates the power of the Personhood Movement in 
South Carolina relative to the power of the mainstream Pro-Life Movement and reflects a 
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biblical understanding of personhood. There are blatant religious tones contained in the 
text of the bill. It contains language about the “sanctity of life” and includes as part of the 
findings of the General Assembly that “all persons are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights” and that “personhood is God-given, as all men are created in 
the image of God.” True to the format long established in Human Life legislation, there is 
no mention of the woman, the fetus, or abortion.  
Biblical understandings of personhood are often accompanied by biblical 
understandings of the role of women and the role of men in relation to women (the 
ramifications of which are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). While the rhetoric of this bill 
may not be extreme or violent, it contains an intertextuality that alerts one to the implied 
meanings of its text. The worldview of personhood, informed by biblical ontology, is 
artificially narrow and contains notable exclusions: women and any consideration of 
female autonomy. Failure to consider the needs, rights, or autonomy of women has 
become a hallmark of the pro-life reproductive health care policy. 
  Personhood: “See no, speak no, hear no evil.” Beyond adoption of biblical 
worldviews that confines acceptable behavior along gender roles, some states take an 
interesting approach in their attempts to end abortion and establish protection of human 
life beginning at conception: they remove language from existing legislation and replace 
it with language consistent with protecting life. Essentially, they rewrite extant laws 
regulating abortion so that the word abortion is omitted. For example, Missouri House 
Bill 14 would change the opening provision of Section 188.010 of the Revised Statutes of 
Missouri from “It is the intention of the general assembly of the state of  Missouri to 
grant the right to life to all humans” to “It is the intention of the general assembly of the 
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state of 3 Missouri to protect the right to life of all humans,” and completely remove the 
phrase “to regulate abortion to the full extent permitted by the Constitution of the United 
States, decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and federal statutes.” In place of 
regulating abortion, House Bill 14 now calls on the state of Missouri to “require due 
process of law before the life of any human, born or unborn, is ended prior to natural 
death.” In lay terms, a woman would be required to go before a judge and get permission 
from that judge to obtain an abortion; her fetus would likely be assigned a lawyer to 
defend its interests in court, paid for with tax dollars. Deploying a similar tactic, 
Indiana’s 2017 House Bill 1134 is an extensive document, repeals all state statutes that 
authorize and regulate abortion—entire subsections of law defining terms and procedures 
are struck, as if the goal was to obliterate its existence. However, erasing a word does not 
end a practice or negate its occurrence and need.  
Even with provisions redefining life as beginning at the moment of conception, 
erasing the language of abortion will do nothing to eradicate the reality of abortion. These 
bills, and their attempt to protect life through erasure of language inconsistent with a 
preferred moral stance, begin to reveal the simplistic worldview of the Personhood 
Movement. This ontology is problematic because it precludes the ability to converse with 
individuals who hold opposing views. It creates a dynamic in which people of differing 
mindsets are unable to come together and work towards solutions because there is no 
middle ground. When our language contours our realities to preclude the opinions of 
others or an acknowledgment of their lived experience, radical polarization is often the 
result. 
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Personhood: Extreme views and lack of compromise. The worldview 
encapsulated within the personhood mindset is one that, through exclusions and erasure, 
creates polarization and an environment that precludes compromise. Proponents of 
Colorado’s Initiative 48 maintained in their talking points that they sought to create a 
space where a dialog could take place about the definition of personhood and life—ironic 
and misleading, given that their proposal would have defined life and eliminated all room 
or need for a conversation. The personhood mindset, in which anything less than full 
rights from the moment of fertilization is capitulation, leaves no common ground for 
conversation or civic debate.  
Inability to engage in civic debate is deeply concerning, especially when it is 
demonstrated from within legislative bodies. In the 2017 session, both the House and the 
Senate for the state of Kansas put forth Concurrent Resolutions (HCR 5009 and SCR 
1607) proposing to amend the State Constitution so that the State Bill of Rights would 
include language guaranteeing the right to life from the moment of fertilization. The 
aspect of the Kansas propositions that I wish to draw attention to is the polemic nature of 
the plain language that would have been placed on the ballot for voters: “A vote against 
this proposition would not amend the constitution, in which case the current federally 
mandated legal status of preborn humans would remain that of a class of human beings 
that can intentionally be killed.” It is important to note that this quote was not pulled 
from a blog or Facebook rant. The language is from the actual text of two bills before a 
state congress. It is language sponsored and supported by government officials who hold 
power and influence over the lived realities of citizens. This level of distortion should be 
disconcerting. However, the verbiage on the ballot is prototypical purist Personhood 
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Movement rhetoric: it is overly-simplified and misrepresentative, it is polemic, it leaves 
no middle ground. 
 Lack of middle ground can also create a lack of a willingness to compromise. In 
2017 alone, Texas legislators introduced at least five bills pushing for the recognition of 
fetal personhood: House Joint Resolution 121, House Joint Resolution 122, House Joint 
Resolution 123, Senate Joint Resolution 9, and House Joint Resolution 104.  
House Joint Resolution (HJR) 121 amends the Texas Constitution by adding four 
new subsections to Section 19, Article I. The newly added Subsection (b) functions by 
redefining “citizen of the state” to be inclusive of all homo sapiens from fertilization or 
“other moment at which an individual member of the human species comes into being.” 
Subsection (c) re-emphasizes the right to life as applying to the unborn and includes 
‘intentionality caveats’ carving out exemptions for in vitro and birth control, also stating 
that the bill does not necessitate the prosecution of a pregnant woman. Subsection (d) 
proscribes abortion “to the fullest extent possible.” Subsection (e) carves out exemptions 
explicitly allowing for abortion in the event of a medical emergency or in cases of rape or 
incest. This seems almost liberal compared to many bills in the category of human life 
legislation. The fact that it has an exception for a medical emergency, and not simply life, 
as well as an exception for rape and incest, would be an anathema to the Personhood 
Movement.  
HJR 122, filed shortly after HJR 121, alters Section 19, Article I of the Texas 
Constitution by adding a Subsection (b) verbatim to HJR 121. However, HJR 122 
excludes the subsections (c), (d), and (e) included in HJR 121. HJR 123, introduced in the 
same legislative session, includes only subsections (b), (c), and (d). The omission of 
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Subsection (e) is significant because it demonstrates a victory of Personhood Movement 
ideology over the wishes of the mainstream Pro-Life Movement.  
What both of these examples demonstrate is the polemic, no compromise nature 
of the Personhood Movement—not surprising, given the movement’s predilection for 
favoring immediate strategies. Taken together, the religious ontologies, ‘see no, speak no, 
hear no evil’ mentality, and extreme unwillingness to compromise practically ensure 
legislation compliant with pure personhood ideologies will, for legal purposes, never be 
more than symbolic. However, at the same time the personhood faction stands resolute in 
their unyielding ways, the mainstream Pro-Life Movement has demonstrated a 
willingness to mold their tactics in an effort to broaden their appeal and pass incremental, 
but legally instrumental legislation.  
Reconstituting the Middle: Extreme Bills Allow for Instrumental Gains 
Jurisdictional issues, court holdings, and extant laws make it more difficult for 
movement advocates to pass legislation establishing fetal personhood and outlawing 
abortion. Most of the proposals to date, at both the state and the federal level, would have 
limited or dubious efficacy—and in some cases, could have an effect opposite that 
intended. Fetal personhood advocates have adopted the conviction that the movement’s 
failures are a result of its compromise and mainstream appeal—believing that the 
movement has strayed from its faith-based, Christian origin—and offers as a solution an 
even more radical stance. In contrast, the mainstream Pro-Life Movement has sought 
workarounds to this ‘problem’ by specifically tailoring their laws to incrementally erode 
abortion rights and alter public discourse surrounding the fetus and life. 
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The renewed vigor of personhood rhetoric in the national discourse and in state 
legislation bolsters the mainstream Pro-Life Movement. Between 2011 and 2013, there 
were as many abortion regulations passed at the state and federal level as in the whole 
decade prior (Nash, Gold, Rowan, Rathbun, & Vierboom, 2014). Incremental pro-life 
legislation, the darlings of the mainstream effort, such as targeted regulations of abortion 
providers (TRAP) laws, mandatory counseling and waiting periods, and laws requiring 
ultrasounds, are achieving astonishing levels of success. In 2000, only 13 states were 
considered hostile to abortion; by 2013, that number had risen to 27, meaning that 56% of 
women live in a state that is hostile to her reproductive autonomy (Nash, Gold, Rowan, 
Rathbun, & Vierboom, 2014). Legislation that, years ago, would have seemed extreme 
and unthinkable, pass today with relatively little pushback. 
Given that the states are a hotbed of Personhood Movement activity, and that 
states often act as a ‘petri dish’ or testing ground for future national activity, it is likely 
that the tactics of Human Life Amendment legislation backed by the Personhood 
Movement will eventually make their way back into the national legislative domain with 
renewed prominence. The unwillingness of the movement to compromise decreases the 
likelihood of the proposals passing and increases the likelihood of a legal challenge 
should any of the bills pass. However, the unwillingness of the movement to consider 
additional perspectives coupled with their discursive and representational practices make 
the re-emergence of the Personhood Movement onto the national stage and into our 
collective civic consciousness a particularly frightening possibility.  
While this chapter focused attention on how the extreme laws of personhood 
ideology work to shift the terrain on which the legal debate surrounding personhood takes 
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place and enables the larger Pro-Life Movement to appear to occupy the middle ground, 
the next chapter includes greater emphasis on the rhetorical practices of Personhood 
Movement activism, examining the ways in which their discourse has seeped into the 
American consciousness and normalized notions of fetal personhood at the expense of 
women. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RECONSTITUTING THE MIDDLE THROUGH DISCOURSE 
The choices made surrounding language for communication and advocacy 
warrant sustained attention because these selections demonstrate, constitute, and 
reinforce the dominant narratives of the movement that are integral to advocacy, praxis, 
and legislative efforts. The Personhood Movement would give rights to zygotes, but it is 
generally careful not to directly state as much. Instead, it defines life as beginning at 
conception or fertilization, rarely addressing the actual implications of this. Rather, the 
movement prefers to use the terms ‘unborn’ or ‘preborn’ to conjure images of fully 
formed children, babies, and infants.  By using terms that call to mind images of fully 
formed newborns, the Personhood Movement is able to misrepresent abortion and vilify 
the procedure more effectively. The humanizing effort plays a large role in why it is so 
important for advocates of personhood to encourage individuals talking about abortion to 
use pronouns or terms like “the child” when referring to the fetus. Personhood Alliance 
cautions their supporters “We don’t refer to born humans as ‘it’ and we shouldn’t give 
the unborn any less respect and dignity” (Harold, 2014). Referring to the fetus as “the 
child” from the moment of conception cognitively acts to humanize it and to place a 
temporal stamp on when life starts. The importance of labels and framing is 
acknowledged by academics and activists alike. By controlling the labels and the 
narrative, a movement increases their power of persuasion and ability to drive results. 
The entire catalyst for the intense effort to pass a Human Life Amendment is because the 
Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that the label person did not apply to the fetus. 
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Working from the assumption that language is dynamic and acts to structure 
worldview, I examine the construction of language for the movement, investigating how 
accounts come to be represented as factual and how certain descriptions—such as that of 
the fetus—are reified, while others—such as that of the woman—are ironized. The 
rhetorical and framing practices of the Personhood Movement reflect a black and white 
mentality and an overly simplified worldview across multiple levels and sites of analysis. 
Given the need for the outward appearance of neutrality, assessments of which facts, 
descriptions, categorizations, and accounts merit reification and which merit ironization 
is rarely explicitly stated in law but is more overt in web content.  
I looked at footing, stake inoculation, and nominalization to gain insight into 
pragmatic intent. Through this, I found patterns of omission and exclusion, inclusions, 
repetition, troubling phrases, and the power of labels, interact to shape and enable 
movement cognition and movement narratives surrounding the legal and social status of 
the fetus and women.  These may seem like a simple turn of phrase that should not have 
the capacity to affect cognition—but linguistic choices are significant because they create 
and reinforce the black and white, condensed frame of the Personhood Movement. The 
polarization and extreme rhetoric of the personhood paradigm erases the middle from the 
conversation and shifts the entire debate to be more in-line with conservative ideologies, 
chiefly through its efforts to humanize the fetus and erase the woman.  
In the following sections, I argue that personhood discourse is damaging, even in 
the absence of legislative victories, partly because it offers a flattened and condensed 
understanding of the world. I first draw from personhood websites to cite examples of 
how the discourse of personhood offers simplified, easily repeatable talking points 
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characterized by an absolutism and an extremism that does not allow for negotiation or 
middle ground. I next argue that the abstracted reality constructed by personhood does 
not require a consideration of nuance or a balancing of interests—one of the clearest 
examples of this is the erasure of the woman from personhood discourse and legislation, 
and the roles and labels she has thrust upon her when she does enter the conversation. I 
explain that in the personhood paradigm, conservative notions about a woman’s place 
and familial roles dominate, and I foreshadow the implications for a balancing of rights 
within this worldview. 
Repetition and Simple Talking Points 
 The oversimplification of rhetoric, characteristic of personhood, is visible through 
the frequent use of the word “just,” as in “that’s just the way it is” or “it’s just that 
simple” (American Life League, n.d.), and the implication of similar uncomplicatedness.  
This is integrally related to the notion of immutable fact, or the idea that “objective Truth 
exists. It does not change” (J. Brown, n.d). Discussions of an absolute, immutable truth 
necessarily preclude a willingness to even consider another vantage point. Discussions of 
absolute, immutable truths necessarily imply and create a framework in which analysis, 
explanation, and nuance become superfluous. Discussions of absolute, immutable truths 
necessarily omit certain narratives from “the Truth” because contradictions are fatal, and 
the stakes are so high. Clinging to the notion of an absolute truth can be a method of 
stake inoculation utilizing nominalization. By situating their work in terms of enacting 
the will of a greater authority, the Personhood Movement is able to adjust the footing 
from which they discuss the topic of abortion while claiming the moral high ground. 
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Correlating with a conviction of absolute truth is a polarization of beliefs. This 
black and white mentality is characteristic of the condensed worldview observable among 
fetal personhood advocates and is demonstrated by statements such as “the bottom line is 
always the same — the baby3 is a person, whose right to life is just as non-negotiable as 
yours or mine” (J. Brown, n.d.) and “there is no conceivable circumstance (exception) 
that justifies an abortion” (Personhood Iowa, n.d., a). Both of these examples display the 
author as speaker making a declarative statement as if it were fact and warrants no further 
debate. Consideration for lived realities is impossible to distill into easily repeatable 
soundbites. Consideration for lived realities complicates the transmission of the 
personhood message—that is why consideration for lived realities and deep levels of 
cognitive engagement do not occur. Instead, advocates of personhood ironize competing 
descriptions of reality, often by excluding them entirely. This is a way of avoiding or 
subverting the intricacies necessarily involved when discussing a balancing of interests, 
or other moral gray zones. There is no acknowledgment of any conceivable middle 
ground or difference in perspective; their worldview does not allow for a balancing of 
rights or a situation in which a woman could need an abortion.   
A similar demonstration of black and white thinking can be found, at the sentence 
structure level, in the formation of thoughts and, by extension, belief systems. For 
example, it is not uncommon for personhood websites to be loaded with oft-repeated 
“Thou shall not” type phrases, such as the declaration “one should never attempt to 
codify in law the importance of one innocent human life over and above another” 
(American Life League, n.d.). The discourse of personhood advocacy frequently uses 
                                                 
3 By baby, they mean zygote or fetus in utero. 
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overly simplified conditional statement with an If/Then or Either/Or structure4. An 
example of this rhetorical device can be observed in the Personhood Alliance statement 
“if the opposition can use emotive language to influence people, [then] I am not above 
doing it too” (Harold, 2014). Sometimes this basic structure may take a more complicated 
If/Then/Therefore structure, such as: “Either the preborn child is a person, or the child is 
not a person. Since the preborn child is a person, there can be no exceptions for abortion” 
(Personhood Iowa, n.d., b). This rigid either/or, neither/nor structure is significant 
because of the role it plays in assembling how people interpret, explain, and interact with 
their world and functions to constrict an individual’s frame of what constitutes truth and 
fact. The rigidity translates beyond sentence structure, extrapolating to worldview—it 
affects how individuals vote, interact with others, and negotiate—or refuse to negotiate. 
Repetition of inflexible thought further cement belief systems, as is observable within 
personhood discourse. 
Erasing the Woman 
 One of the key differences between the rhetoric of the Pro-Life Movement and the 
Personhood Movement comes from their willingness to compromise and to consider 
exemptions for the health of the woman, or in cases of rape or incest, in abortion 
restrictions. The Pro-life Movement, in using the language of exemptions, does at least 
                                                 
4 At other times, this format is turned around to a Neither/Nor structure: “Rape and incest are both criminal 
acts, and in our system of justice we punish the criminal. We do not punish the victim, nor do we punish 
the criminal’s children,” and “We do not put criminal’s innocent children to death in our culture; it simply 
isn’t done. It should not be done in this situation, either” (Personhood Iowa, n.d., a) Here, too, the mindset 
of “Thou shall nots” and rigid, zero-sum mentalities prohibit any sense of a middle ground. It also has the 
power to distort the language choice used. Notice, for example, that the ‘innocent children’ belong to the 
criminal—only his parentage is recognized, and the woman is entirely removed from the frame. This 
erasure is, at least partially, by design, because the argument becomes complicated when another 
individual’s autonomy comes into the picture. 
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recognize the existence of the woman. The personhood faction, through its unwillingness 
to compromise or consider exceptions, ironizes the position of the woman and excludes 
her from the debate. The rhetorical practices of personhood are specifically framed in a 
manner that harnesses the power of narrative and labels to humanize the fetus while 
erasing the woman.  
Feminist legal scholars are particularly attuned to the role of labels and narrative 
in creating the frame through which women are viewed in the abortion debate (see 
McCaffrey and Keys, 2000; Oaks, 2000; Roth, 2000; Holc, 2004; Sanger, 2008; 
Madrazo, 2014). Generally, personhood texts in this sample addressed women in narrow 
and limiting ways (see Table 2, pg. 58): by treating her as someone who is subjected to 
and a victim of abortion, by constituting her as a mother, or by omitting mention of her 
entirely. Only one of the bills in the federal samples, Senate Joint Resolution 137 (1981), 
acknowledged the woman as something other than the mother, referring to her as the 
‘pregnant woman” rather than assigning her the maternal role. Additionally, only one of 
the bills in the state sample mentioned the woman as a “pregnant woman” rather than 
treating her as a mother or excluding mention of her at all. In the ten years after Roe, nine 
of the thirteen bills federal examined for this study included no mention of the pregnant 
woman. Over half of the state bills examined exclude her from the conversation. This is a 
curious omission—or intentional exclusion—of any consideration of the woman in many 
of the legislative texts. When she is mentioned, she is mentioned in her role as mother or 
in relation to her (or sometimes the) unborn child. In the data set of contemporary federal 
laws, the woman assumed as a mother in all but two of them, through reference to “her 
unborn child.”  Use of the possessive creates a situation in which the woman is a mother, 
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whether she sees herself in that role or not and whether she desires to continue the 
pregnancy to term or not. The use of language in the bills is not accidental—it is a 
deliberate deployment of a powerful emotive frame on the part of personhood advocates. 
By portraying the woman in the mother role, the movement manages to set up an 
expectation of socially acceptable behavior for her: she will care for the needs of “her 
child,” she will demonstrate some level of selflessness, she will never even think about an 
abortion. 
Table 2 
Treatment of Women in Coding from Examined Bills and Personhood Web Content from 
Georgia Right to Life (GRTL), Personhood Iowa (PI), and American Life League (ALL) 
Coding Phrasing # Source 
As Victim "woman upon who an 
abortion is performed” 
"each time an abortion occurs, 
a woman is victimized" 
3 IA HF 297 (2017)     
IA HF 253 (2017) 




"the mother,” “her baby,” 
“her unborn child,” “life of 
the mother” 
11 The Mothers Life (PI), Why We 
Must Vote Prolife (GRTL), HR 
374 (2011), 
HR 1091 (2013), S. 231 (2017), 
HR 681 (2017), HR 881 (2009), 
TX HJR 123 (2017), TX HJR 121 
(2017), MI HB 4279 (2017), MI 
HB 4279 (2017) 
Independent "pregnant woman" 1 The Mothers Life (PI) 
Omitted  18 Rape and Incest (PI), What We Do 
To Help (PI), Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL), SJ Res 110 
(1981), HJ Res 261 (1973), SJ Res 
3 (1983), SJ Res 6 (1975), HJ Res 
681 (1975), SJ Res 11 (1975), HJ 
Res 294 (1979),HJ Res 1041 
(1974), SJ Res 91 (1975), HJ Res 
427 (1973), HR 3069 (2003), HR 
552 (2005), TX SJR 9 (2017-
2018), TX HJR 122 (2017), MO 
HB 14 (2017) 
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An interesting linguistic choice in many of the texts is the phrase “a woman upon 
whom an abortion is performed,” as seen in Iowa’s House File 297 and Senate File 253. 
This framing situates women as unwilling victims—it robs them of their autonomy and 
presumes that they are wholly passive in the decision to seek out an abortion.  I do not 
point this out to imply that forced abortions or reproductive coercion are not real 
problems, they certainly are, and they certainly warrant sustained attention beyond the 
scope of this discussion. However, in the context of this legislation and the worldview 
associated with personhood activism, there appears to be a belief that every woman who 
seeks an abortion is “in crisis” and misguided or coerced. There is a dangerous resistance 
to believing that a woman could, of clear and rational mind, decide to have an abortion. 
This is benevolent sexism. This is patronizing. This is what is at the heart of Randall 
Lake’s argument that “By ‘protecting’ women from abortion, these measures signal their 
promulgators intent to help women achieve Redemption by limiting the potential for 
future Disobedience” (1984, p. 435), and contributes to the social pressures that, when 
coupled with legislative barriers and misinformed consent, is, itself, a form of 
reproductive coercion. 
While the woman is positioned as a mother in the language of personhood bills 
and debate, she is still curiously pushed from the picture when a male enters into the 
conversation. Aaron Wagner (2001) calls for greater consideration of the father in the 
debate over abortion, but many personhood websites take this notion to a disturbing 
extreme. Personhood Iowa discusses the fetus as “the criminal’s innocent child”—with 
no mention of the woman. How a woman is dealt with in cases of rape/incest with the 
Pro-Life Movement is troubling and revealing: women are essentially viewed as 
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incubators. Many of the bills contain phrases granting life, from fertilization and 
throughout biological development, “irrespective of condition of dependency.” The fetus 
is dependent on the woman—and yet, she is frequently sidelined or pushed from the 
frame entirely: reduced to someone upon whom a fetus may have a “condition of 
dependency.” The fetus is reified, superseding the woman in the conversation about 
rights. The balancing of rights alluded to in the oral arguments of Roe v. Wade does not 
even come into play because the woman is not even acknowledged, let alone her 
interests. In an analysis of international human rights conventions, legal scholars Rhonda 
Copelon, Christina Zampas, Elizabeth Brusie, and Jacqueline deVore (2005) conclude 
that any right to life is contingent upon birth. They express concerns, similar to what 
Robin West (2005) refers to as “forced Good Samaritanism,” with the effort to 
subordinate a woman to the role and requirements of involuntary motherhood and 
situations in which certain women are reduced to human vessels (Copelon, Zampas, 
Brusie, & deVore, 2005).  There are dangers of this resulting in discrimination (Seigel, 
2005; 2010) and forced motherhood (Roth, 2000; Holc, 2004; Madrazzo, 2014).  
The absence of the woman’s interests is also visible in the verb choice of the 
Personhood Movement and the frequent use of the language of war, violence, and crime. 
Visitors to pro-personhood websites will find position statements with hyperbolic 
imagery and various guides for how to alter their language to more effectively talk about 
“the crime of abortion.” For example, Personhood Alliance urges their followers to “use 
the phrase ‘commit abortion’” as a way of stressing the criminality of the act (Harold, 
2014). Personhood websites (and, in fairness, Pro-Life websites) often use the phrase 
“abortion is murder” and discuss how the Pro-Choice side approves of “killing babies.” 
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These may seem like innocent slogans, but when placed in the same mindset of “the pro-
life fight is God’s battle” and “uncompromising, Truth-affirming principles” (J. Brown, 
n.d.), they become more vexing. Recall, Kansas had two bills (House Concurrent 
Resolution 5009 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 1607) “recognizing the authority of 
the state of Kansas to exercise its police power and its sovereign right to adopt individual 
liberties in the constitution of the state of Kansas more expansive than those conferred by 
the constitution of the United States...” This introduces the possibility of fetal rights being 
used as a bio-punishment mechanism specifically targeting women and demonstrates the 
willingness of the state of Kansas to go to extreme measures to protect, what they view, 
as their sovereign right to do so. By implying that anything short of absolute protection of 
the fetus is akin to cruelly treating them like animals, the movement sets up the discourse 
recipients to be more amicable or receptive towards statements, such as “the 
dehumanization and murdering of preborn children [is] unthinkable” (Personhood 
Alliance, n.d.), and less likely to question the accuracy of the depiction. Oft repeated 
hyperbolic statements affect cognition—especially for a topic as emotionally charged as 
abortion. 
The introduction of personhood discourse in an already militarized mindset is 
damaging to women because it represents a paradigm shift that conceptualizes “the fetus 
as an entity with legal rights independent of the pregnant woman has made possible the 
future creation of fetal rights that could be used against the pregnant woman” (Johnsen, 
1986, p. 604). An example of this can be seen when a state forces women into substance 
abuse rehabilitation after the Court takes custody of the fetus (Oaks, 2000). The 
incremental approach deployed by the mainstream Pro-Life Movement have begun to 
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create a set of fetal rights that are “increasingly hostile” and “potentially at odds” with the 
autonomy of the woman (Johnsen, 1986, p. 559; Krauss, 1991; Daniels, 1993; Duden, 
1993; Roth, 2000; L. Brown, 2005; Copelon, Zampas, Brusie, & Devore, 2005; Goldman, 
2011; Will, 2013; Henricks, 2015; Al-Sibai, 2017) while the rhetoric of the Personhood 
Movement normalized the mindset encapsulated by these laws. This introduces the 
possibility fetal rights could be used to punish women (Daniels, 1993; Roth, 2000; L. 
Brown, 2005; Will, 2013) and is central to Lake’s (1984) claim “punishment demand a 
subject to be punished…Guilt requires a Victim if it is to be Redeemed. The Victim in 
anti-abortion rhetoric is woman” (p. 434). 
While the United States has yet to pass a Human Life Amendment, if this were to 
occur, it would allow an empirical assessment of legal scholars’ concerns regarding fetal 
rights. Janine Holc (2004) examines the 1997 decision in Poland which held abortion was 
an unconstitutional violation of the right to life, noting that “the court’s discourse 
constructed not only a presumption of fetal personhood but a space in which the fetus 
becomes a subject of the state— here, the subject of state authority and social welfare 
goals” (Holc, 2004, p. 755). She argues the fetus becomes “the purest citizen,” due, in 
part, to its being interpreted as a tabula rasa on which national fantasies can be projected 
and that “women… are marked as vessels of the nation’s moral integrity, survival, and 
coherence, Thus, reproductive politics—particularly restrictive abortion laws—have 
become the territory on which conservative social ideologies play out fantasies of the 
ideal female-as-mother” (Holc, 2004, p. 756, citations omitted). Holc’s research 
demonstrates the capability of personhood ideology to shift the footing of the abortion 
debate onto distinctly more conservative territory—a framework which uplifts the status 
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of the fetus at the expense of the woman carrying it. Personhood’s deployment of this 
representational frame has caused conversations surrounding start of life to take on more 
conservative tones in the national dialog. This represents a shift in the middle ground that 
has been exploited by the mainstream Pro-Life Movement to capitalize on the 
humanization of the fetus and the erasure of the woman in order to pass perilous 
legislation. In the following chapter I explore this idea further and shift to examine how, 
even in the absence of a major Human Life Amendment victory, the rhetoric of 
personhood paves the way for mainstream Pro-Life success and normalizes dangerous 
positions in the national discussion of rights. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LAW AND DISCOURSE 
When considering how laws and belief systems—represented through discursive 
practices—interact, it is important to keep in mind that the relationship is reciprocal and 
not as simple as the macro causing the micro or the micro causing the macro: both levels 
of thought and expression co-constitute each other. The complete worldview drives and 
frames the language choices, creating both the text of the laws and the rhetorical practices 
of the movement. The laws legitimize the representational practices of personhood by 
portraying the fetus as human, and the discourse of the movement is the driving force 
behind the proposal of these bills as well as the belief that they are even necessary. While 
the legislative effort to enact personhood-compliant legislation has not succeeded in 
passing an amendment at the federal or state level, the rhetorical practices and 
representational framework of the Personhood Movement is successfully altering the 
national discourse surrounding start of life and abortion. The extreme views of the 
Personhood Movement work to reconstitute the middle—making some of the tactics of 
the mainstream Pro-Life Movement seem moderate and reasonable by comparison. 
Laws and Movement Communications Concomitance 
Examining only laws or only advocacy communication offers a limited view of 
any movement. Movement discourse creates frames through which advocates form 
cognitive schemas and understand their world. Simultaneously, movement discourse 
drives action—often in the form of legislation. Laws have the power to reify or ironize 
competing visions of reality and competing visions of an ideal future in a way that 
standard discourse does not due to the authority represented by the law. Laws are a 
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powerful tool for nominalization. Laws contour the viable options for movement action 
and shape discourse just as movement discourse shapes laws—by providing model 
legislation or by lobbying on behalf of a particular cause and raising attention to it, for 
example. Essentially, the language of law and the language of movement 
communications co-constitute the frame that forms the basis for movement activism. 
The Personhood Movement has an active legal consciousness that engages in 
intertextual practices and repetition to bolster its credibility and embed itself within a 
larger legislative discourse. The Pro-Life Movement as a whole, and personhood 
advocates, in particular, are often well versed in Supreme Court cases, quickly and 
rapidly comparing the holding in Roe v. Wade to Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), extolling 
the virtues of Gonzales v. Carhart5 and Harris v. McRae6, or criticizing the decision in 
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt7. In legislation, sponsors of personhood bills 
frequently cross-reference other legal documents or judicial holdings to create a lineage 
of precedence. An example of this can be seen in Texas’ bill calling on the U.S. Congress 
to pass a federal Human Life Amendment. Not only does this practice situate a particular 
                                                 
5 Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) concerned the legality of a federal ‘partial birth abortion’ ban. The Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was challenged on 5th Amendment grounds because it lacked exceptions 
necessary to protect the health of the mother. The composition of the Court much altered from Stenberg v. 
Carhart (2000), ruled 5-4 that the ban was not a violation of the constitution. In her dissent, Justice 
Ginsberg noted: "The Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is not concealed." 
6 Harris v. McRae (1980) held that states participating in Medicaid were not required to provide funds for 
abortion procedures, upholding the Hyde Amendment. 
7 Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) concerned Texas’ 2013 omnibus anti-abortion bill H.B.2, 
which is representative of other Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws. At stake in the 
courts analysis was if a consideration of substantial burden could or should take into account the extent to 
which abortion restrictions actually promote the state’s interest in protecting the health of women and 
whether or not Texas H.B. 2 amounted to undue burden. Finding that the substantial burden imposed on 
women seeking an abortion should be weighed against the actuality of a law achieving what it is purporting 
to through regulation, the Court held that Texas’ H.B. 2 amounted to an unconstitutional burden. 
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effort to pass personhood legislation within a greater struggle, it creates a greater sense of 
importance and professionalism by calling on past legislation to validate itself. 
Despite some of the more inflammatory rhetoric, the Personhood Movement is 
purposeful, strategic, and organized. Take, for example, tips on “How To Talk To Your 
Legislator” available from Personhood Alliance (2014) and Georgia Right to Life (2017): 
these documents are verbatim replicas of one another. The purpose of the document is to 
walk pro-life supporters through the process of communicating with their legislator for 
“personal visits, telephone calls, letter writing and rapid communication” (Personhood 
Alliance, 2014; Georgia Right to Life, 2017). This document is moderate in tone and 
proposes reasonable advice, drawing from psychological principles of argumentation and 
persuasion. Furthermore, it stresses the imperatives of repetition, reiteration, and 
sustained contact. The importance of this cannot be overstated: The Personhood 
Movement has tapped into certain understandings about the power of language that could 
promote even greater success. Repetition is significant at the level of individual thought 
because word choice, especially if a limited number of emotionally charged words are 
frequently reiterated, affects how individuals construct their thoughts, beliefs, and 
communications. All of these effect action. Repetition and sustained contact similarly are 
critical to advocacy and movement growth. Much of the success of the Pro-Life 
Movement is due to their level of engagement, emotive language, and creative, consistent 
efforts. Consistency is key. Repetition is key. This is why the movement uses phrases 
such as “The bottom line is always the same…” (American Life League, 2017) and 
constantly refer to the fetus as the unborn or preborn child. Repeating a statement may 
not make it factual, but it can make it true in an individual’s understanding of reality. 
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Looking at the success of the movement seeking to limit abortion and erode 
reproductive healthcare rights exposes a potentially crucial flaw in the strategy of choice 
advocates. There appears, at times, to be an assumption of rationality; an assumption that 
those engaged in conversations about abortion, healthcare, and choice will understand—
and share—the position of the choice paradigm. There is a sincerely held belief that 
translates into much of the pro-choice side assuming that moderate individuals will 
comprehend the importance of protecting reproductive autonomy. This is a faulty 
assumption. Given the level of commitment and success of pro-life activism relative to 
pro-choice activism, one could be forgiven for thinking the pro-life side tries harder. 
However, I do not believe this to be true. Rather, I think the frame employed by the pro-
life Personhood movement is more conducive to repetition and simplistic persuasion.  
The frame constructed by the Personhood Movement is one defined by its 
absolutism. Truth is absolute and immutable—ordained by God (J. Brown, n.d.). When 
the Personhood Movement refers to the importance of law, it is just as likely they are 
talking about God’s Law, as explicated in the Bible, as it is they are talking about the 
Constitution or man’s law. The frame constructed by the Personhood Movement is one 
defined by a black and white, either/or mentality. It is rife with oversimplification and 
specious comparisons. The frame constructed by the Personhood Movement is one 
defined by its selectivity of focus—first God, then the unborn (J. Brown, n.d.). The 
woman, if she is referred to at all, is assigned the role and expectations of the mother. 
This assessment is patriarchal and subjugates the lives and rights of women. The 
discursive tactics and position statements of the Personhood Movement demonstrate a 
clear hostility towards women through assigned positionality and outright erasure. An 
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example can be seen in the Personhood Iowa position statements which refer to the fetus 
as “the criminal’s innocent child” (n.d., a) in explaining their objections to exceptions for 
rape and incest; the woman carrying the child is not acknowledged in a parenting role of 
authority as soon as the man comes into the picture. This is blatantly inimical towards 
women. The legislation falling under the umbrella of Human Life Amendments are 
equally hostile towards the autonomy and rights of women, albeit in a subtler manner.  
Throughout the paper, I have often noted a lack of exemptions in abortion bans: 
most of these laws lack exemptions for the health of the mother and most lack 
exemptions for cases of rape and incest. However, the language of exemptions is itself 
problematic. By discussing the instances in which women would be permitted an 
abortion, women have already been stripped of a right. Furthermore, by discussing the 
importance of exemptions for rape and incest—both horrific bodily violations—it signals 
that a woman lacks the right her own body and her own medical decisions until she has 
been horrifically violated. Abortion is a valid, and sometimes necessary, medical 
procedure. It is part of comprehensive health care. By limiting women’s access to 
abortion, the government is denying women full autonomy and, by extension, citizenship 
rights. Discussion of exemptions obfuscate this and utilizes language to conceal the true 
implications of an abortion ban for the standing of women as equal citizens.  
This is the power of language. When the language of proposed legislation reflects 
the rhetoric of the Personhood Movement, it has the power to reify and validate their 
narrow conception of reality. Personhood legislation attempts to codify the status of the 
fetus as that of a person. While they may not have been successful to date, it is none-the-
less influencing the conversation surrounding abortion and the start of life in this country. 
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The ways in which we conceptualize ideas is integrally rooted in the language we use to 
define, describe, and discuss those ideas. Increasingly, the terms used are in line with the 
rhetoric of personhood. In the pages that follow I draw attention to the altered terrain of 
the abortion political landscape and provide concrete examples of mainstream pro-life 
legislation made possible due to the rhetoric of personhood. I examine the effects of these 
laws for women, specifically the marginalized women most impacted by this type of 
legislation. I conclude by encouraging choice advocates to engage in reflexivity and soul-
searching, as well as provide ideas on how to undermine the discursive practices of the 
Personhood Movement. 
Reconstituting the Middle 
 The repetition and representations of personhood rhetoric have infiltrated the 
national consciousness. We are increasingly consuming more bits of information at even 
faster rates as opposing viewpoints compete for our attention and support across more 
platforms than ever before. The rhetoric of personhood offers easily digestible, easily 
repeatable soundbites that do not require deep cognitive engagement. It eliminates the 
complicatedness of grey zones and navigating compromises. In many ways, it 
encapsulates the polarized mentality of the contemporary political landscape. 
 The discourse and legislative efforts of the Personhood Movement have 
successfully altered the abortion political landscape in two notable ways: first, the 
linguistic choices and representational practices have greatly humanized the fetus and 
changed how society views the fetus. Second, the sustained presence of the personhood 
ideology in the national mindset has shifted the middle to the right, allowing for 
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successes from the mainstream Pro-Life Movement that are equally damaging (if not 
more so) to women’s rights and abortion access. 
Humanizing the fetus. Personhood websites work to humanize the fetus through 
visual representations and descriptive practices. The movement utilizes many different 
tactics to validate the construction of the fetus as a person deserving of full legal rights. 
One of the ways in which they try to humanize the fetus is by the discerning choice of 
language and labels. There is also a selective utilization and ridicule of science and 
medicine. Websites will contain statements holding up science as an arbiter of truth when 
it suits them—for example, discussing how the fetus is human and concluding “that’s just 
pure science” (American Life League, 2017)—and deride science when it potentially 
threatens their conception of reality—for example, “human fetus is just scientific jargon 
for little one” (American Life League, 2017). Reference to the fetus as little ones, preborn 
children, and unborn babies—often accompanied on the webpage with pictures of days or 
weeks-old infants—is another approach used by the Personhood Movement to humanize 
the fetus. 
 In terms of legislative efforts, the fetus is being humanized through the discursive 
practices of Human Life Amendments and the successes of mainstream efforts in other 
areas of law. Human Life Amendments humanize the fetus through their attempts to 
bestow the fetus with equal rights and protections from the first moments of 
development. These bills frequently assimilate language of the Personhood Movement 
through a similar pattern of inclusions and omissions as well as the use of the language, 
such as preborn and unborn child. Simultaneously, legislation from the mainstream Pro-
Life Movement works to humanize the fetus in domains outside of constitutional law, 
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such as criminal and inheritance law. In many ways, this effort has been successful. For 
example, fetal homicide laws which allow charges to be brought against someone for the 
death of a fetus (Johnsen, 1986; Crist, 2010) and chemical endangerment laws, which 
have increasingly been used to punish pregnant women for behavior that may affect their 
fetus in utero, as noted by Kathryn Killett:  
There is concern that chemical endangerment laws intrude upon women's 
constitutional rights and carry alarming implications because they open the 
door for states to incarcerate women for engaging in an array of 
questionable, yet legal activities (2014, p. 455). 
Would this even be a concern if we lived in a society in which our dominant discourses 
did not humanize the fetus at the expense of women?  
While I maintain that discourse and how we talk about the fetus is crucial to the 
process by which the fetus is humanized, it would be dishonest to downplay the role of 
technology. The problem is partially how we ‘see’ the fetus in relation to the woman and 
in relationship to society (Holc, 2004, p. 766). This has become normalized in law, such 
as mandatory ultrasounds (Sanger, 2008) and informed consent laws (Ahmed, 2015; 
Daniels, Ferguson, Howard, & Roberti, 2016), as well as common social practices, such 
as voluntary ultrasounds and baby showers. Carol Sanger, the Barbara Aronstein Black 
Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, discusses the notion of social birth and the 
contributions of ultrasounds and social media to the conversations on the beginning of 
life. She explains how the increase in prominence of ultrasounds as part of routine 
perinatal care and the higher quality of ultrasounds, especially the new availability of 
three-dimensional ultrasounds, coupled with the increased prominence of social media, 
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creates a social birth independent of natal birth (2008). It is not uncommon for parents to 
create social media accounts for their offspring in utero—posting ultrasound images and 
status updates (Sanger, 2008; 2012b). These practices affect the cultural understandings 
of life and alter the conversation surrounding life. 
 Even with technology, language clearly is important to the social understanding of 
life and rights. Sanger (2008, 2012b) notes the language choices made by nurses 
performing ultrasounds reflects an understanding of this as nurses deliberately use 
different terms and phrases when the fetus appears to be in distress or to have a condition 
incompatible with life. In addition to social and medical communications acting to 
humanize the fetus and alter public discourse on life, the mainstream legislation also 
contributes. Informed consent laws, a darling of the mainstream Pro-Life Movement, 
establish scripts and pamphlets, written by legislatures consisting of members with little 
or no medical expertise, which doctors must read and provide to their patients. These 
documents contain shocking inaccuracies, but the most common error in informed 
consent packets is a speeding up of the development of human-like qualities (Daniels, 
Ferguson, Howard, & Roberti, 2016). As noted by Cynthia Daniels and her research team 
in their study of informed consent laws in the United States: 
Fetal development was “accelerated” by misrepresenting development of 
certain body systems earlier than in developmental reality. And body 
systems that appear to attribute human “intentionality” or more “baby-like” 
characteristics to the embryo or fetus, such as breathing, seeing, crying, or 
experiencing pain, were more likely to be misrepresented at earlier stages 
of development (2016, p. 195). 
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Another example of mainstream pro-life laws that subtly work to cement fetal 
personhood in the public consciousness are “Missing Angel Acts,” which grant birth 
certificates to the parents of stillborns (Sanger, 2012b). While proponents of these laws 
contend they are important in order to recognize the parents and give a public record to 
their experience encompassing more than just their loss, opponents fear it created 
“compulsory mourning” and could have dangerous ramifications of the legal status of 
abortion (Sanger, 2012b). 
What all of this contributes to is a discursive frame in which shifts are observable 
in how we see the fetus in relation to the government and in relation to how we see the 
woman. As the fetus becomes human and citizen, in the eyes of society and in the eyes of 
the law, the woman experiences an inverse phenomenon in which she is stripped of full 
citizenship rights and becomes viewed as less than fully human—while the fetus may be 
granted personhood, the woman is robbed of hers.  
Relocating the Center. The extreme rhetoric of personhood discourse effectively 
relocates the center by altering what appears reasonable in comparison. The personhood 
mindset normalizes the fetus as a person in public and legislative discourse, acting as a 
“foot in the door” for additional gains in persuasive grounding. The personhood mindset, 
through its unwillingness to compromise, changes the terrain on which these 
conversations take place. The personhood mindset, by virtue of its severe rhetoric, locates 
the mainstream Pro-Life Movement in a prime position to bargain and make incremental 
gains. Due to personhood’s insistence on immediate legislative success, incremental 
approaches to eroding abortion rights are able to escape close scrutiny and masquerade as 
“common sense” or “good sense compromise” between pro-life and pro-choice stances. 
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Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers (TRAP) bills, laws mandating fetal 
anesthesia, law concerning mandatory ultrasounds, waiting periods or informed consent, 
as well as laws allowing courts to take custody of embryos, and laws regulating the 
disposition of fetal tissue are all examples of mainstream pro-life legislation that benefits 
from the humanization of the fetus created by personhood discourse. At the same time, 
legislation of this nature does virtually nothing to promote the health or the well-being of 
the woman carrying the fetus while it actively works to perpetuate the notion of the fetus 
as a person, family member, and citizen.  
Laws stipulating requirements for mandatory ultrasounds, counseling and waiting 
periods, and informed consent laws are often framed by the Pro-Life Movement as part of 
a woman’s “right to know” (Sanger, 2012; Ahmed, 2015; Daniels, Ferguson, Howard, & 
Roberti, 2016). Despite being framed in pseudo-feminist language these laws are not 
protective of women. Instead, they are paternalistic, operating off of a presupposition that 
women are incapable of assessing their own needs in making reproductive decisions and 
require the assistance of the state as mediator. While during the witch hunt, the (male) 
doctor took over the role of the midwife (Federici, 2014). Today, the (typically male) 
legislator takes over the role of the doctor in making medical decisions for the woman 
(Ginsberg, 1985). In both of these instances the needs and wants of the woman—in fact, 
the woman herself—are erased from the picture. The discourse of personhood has made 
this seem acceptable. 
Counseling and waiting period for abortions often go hand in hand. While consent 
is a standard requirement prior to initiation of a medical procedure, the regulations of 
informed consent for abortions is particularly targeted, egregious, and steeped in the 
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language of personhood. Thirty-five states mandate counseling and twenty-nine of these 
states stipulate what information is to be given (Guttmacher, 2017a). However, a 2016 
nation-wide study indicated that “nearly one-third of the informed consent information 
was medically inaccurate” (Daniels, Ferguson, Howard, & Roberti, p. 181). Almost all of 
the states which require pre-abortion counseling require detailed information on fetal 
development; thirteen states require the woman be (mis)informed that the fetus is capable 
of feeling pain; six states informed consent includes the statement that personhood begins 
at conception; thirty-three states require that the woman be told the gestational age of the 
fetus (Guttmacher, 2017a). Furthermore, twenty-seven states require anywhere from 
twenty-four to seventy-two hours elapse between receiving the counseling and giving 
consent/undergoing the procedure, and many states require the information be conveyed 
in person—often necessitating multiple trips to a clinic (Guttmacher, 2017a; Daniels, 
Ferguson, Howard, & Roberti, 2016) The burdensome nature of these laws is exacerbated 
in states which mandate ultrasounds prior to abortions. Despite the fact that there is 
typically no medical reason for doing so in the first trimester, fourteen states require an 
ultrasound; in ten of the states the woman must be encouraged to view the fetus, and in 
three states the woman is required to view and listen to a description of the fetus. 
(Guttmacher, 2017b). These stipulations are codified into law based on the belief that if 
the fetus is humanized to the pregnant woman, she will forgo an abortion. 
These laws, through requiring the woman to engage in an activity typically 
associated with motherhood, such as viewing the ultrasound, rely on the phenomenon of 
“social birth” to dissuade women from seeking abortions (Sanger, 2008) and are part of a 
spectrum of state endorsed coercive medical practices. The experience is made more 
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emotionally taxing for the woman as she additionally grapples with the confusion of 
state-sponsored misinformation campaigns dressed up as informed consent. The ability to 
exercise a right to personal autonomy becomes more time consuming, more emotionally 
taxing, and less economically viable through the implementation of mandatory 
ultrasounds, counseling, and waiting periods necessitating multiple trips to the clinic. 
This experience is compounded for low-income women and women dependent on 
Medicaid because the Hyde Amendment prohibits coverage of their care. 
For women who are not situated in such a position that they have the support 
network to navigate the burdens imposed by these regulations, the result can be a 
profound social isolation that resembles banishment. A woman facing an unwanted 
pregnancy experiences alienation from a society in which the procedure she is attempting 
to procure is legal—yet, she may be treated as if she has gravely transgressed 
acceptability because the procedure has tremendous stigma purposefully and maliciously 
attached to it in a very public way. The legal environment surrounding abortion and 
reproductive rights has been carefully crafted—aided by personhood discourse—in order 
to make implicit claims about women, motherhood, and citizenship. These laws continue 
the infantilizing tradition of coverture (MacKinnon, 1984). By working off the 
assumption that women must be looked after and cared for as property, these laws ignore 
women’s agency and autonomy. Furthermore, they make presuppositions that take for 
granted motherhood as natural and desirable for all women. This is at play in the stigma 
surrounding abortion: regulatory efforts and the laws surrounding abortion stigmatize 
both the procedure—by making it seem more dangerous and akin to murdering innocent 
children—and the women who undergo the procedure—by making them seem deserving 
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of punishment and less than deserving of full citizenship rights for failure to protect ‘their 
children’ or being complicit in ‘their murder.’ While these laws clearly make gender-
based claims on citizenship, the disproportionate effect they have on women of color, 
indigenous women, women whose primary language is not English, and rural women 
draws attention to the ways in which these regulations also construct racialized 
citizenship in addition to gendered citizenship.  
 Mainstream pro-life legislative successes have made abortion more onerous and 
burdensome to obtain in a number of states. For example, after Texas passed House Bill 
2, their omnibus abortion bill, there was an increase from 10% to 44% in patients who 
traveled more than fifty miles to obtain an abortion. Nationally, 17% of women travel at 
least fifty miles, and 31% of women in rural areas travel over one-hundred miles to 
procure an abortion (Bearak, Burke, & Jones, 2016). Additionally, fewer clinics mean 
longer wait times. Delay in receiving abortion care can increase the associated costs and 
force women into a situation where they have to undergo a riskier procedure simply 
because they are at a later gestational stage. Increased distance between women and their 
healthcare provider also increases the risk to women if a complication arises as a result of 
the procedure.  
Yet, all of this seems normal and acceptable to many legislatures and much of 
America due to the presence of personhood discourse in our national dialog. If this saves 
lives—which is a dubious claim8—then it can be argued that the Personhood Movement 
                                                 
8 Take, for example, Texas. Texas has remarkably restrictive pro-life policies designed to limit the number 
or abortions and protect families. Texas had an infant mortality rate of 5.7/1000 live births, or 2,287 infant 
deaths in 2016 (CDC, 2016). Furthermore, the maternal mortality rate is staggering at 35.6/ 100,000 live 
births; “If Texas were a country, it would have the highest maternal mortality rate in the developed world 
and would be on a par with Mexico or Turkey” (Quinn, 2017). 
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benefits, at least partially, from the mainstream Pro-Life Movement. Despite the harsh 
rebuke much of the mainstream Pro-Life Movement offers the Personhood Movement, 
they likewise benefit from the very movement they wish to distance themselves from. 
They share a mutually symbiotic relationship in which they diverge in tactics but not in 
goals. The mainstream Pro-Life Movement is able to maintain a cloak of respectability 
and reasonableness, while the Personhood Movement maintains a hardline stance. This 
relationship, while benefiting both groups, has a lopsided benefit for the Pro-Life 
Movement. Any success for personhood is a pro-life success. However, not every pro-life 
success is a success for personhood. The Personhood Movement is sincere in their 
conviction and dedication to pursuing an immediate strategy—that is why they oppose 
bills with exemptions. They do not favor an incremental strategy. They are not content to 
merely relocate the middle. They want the entire discourse to change. 
The Dangers of Personhood Rhetoric and Where to Go from Here 
 The success of personhood rhetoric at shifting the footing of the debate is 
dangerous in how it enables the greater success of the mainstream Pro-Life Movement 
and normalizes a discourse of personhood at the expense of women’s rights. The sheer 
degree of polarization of the personhood frame moves the middle to ‘the right.’ Someone 
arguing the choice stance may feel as though they must pick and choose which 
misstatements, distortions, or outright lies to refute because it is too daunting of a task to 
refute them all. Furthermore, they are so often repeated that they affect the cognitive 
schemas, including for people who do not believe that a fetus is a person. Even in the 
process of conducting this research and writing this analysis, I found myself occasionally 
referring to the pregnant woman as a mother or the fetus, in later stages of development, 
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as the child. Or, I found myself saying things like: ‘ignoring x for a moment,’ or, ‘setting 
aside x to focus on…’ This is problematic. Women cannot afford to ignore or set aside x, 
and we cannot afford to have our allies ignore or set aside x. 
 Pro-life legal victories create dangerous precedents which illuminated the path 
towards eroding reproductive freedoms through increasingly burdensome regulatory 
tactics. These factors come together with the discourse of personhood to create an 
insidious legal arrangement in which states and the federal government are emboldened 
to pass laws that have deleterious effects on women’s rights, health, and wellbeing, often 
dedicating their actions in the name of fetal rights. These laws disproportionately affect 
marginalized groups—such as indigenous women, women of color, rural women, and 
women of lower socioeconomic status (Smith, 2005; Williamson & Taylor, 2016; 
Bearak, Burke, & Jones, 2017; Hennessy-Fiske, 2016; Green, 2016; Upadhyay, Johns, 
Meckstroth, & Kerns, 2017). The normalization of personhood rhetoric cannot be 
allowed to continue unchallenged and unabated. The arguments of the Personhood 
Movement must be undermined, and the arguments against it must be strengthened. 
 Undermining the arguments of the Personhood Movement. Undermining the 
agenda of the Personhood Movement begins with understanding what their arguments are 
and how they leverage discourse to turn language into action. It requires examining how 
their rhetorical practices construct certain accounts as factual and undermine competing 
descriptions. It requires looking at their pragmatic intent and examining footing, stake, 
stake inoculation, and nominalization. It requires looking at how they ironize and reify 
worldviews through language (Potter, 1996). Discourse analysis hinges on the premise 
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that words are not only imbued with meaning but that they are specifically chosen and 
arranged by the actor for a purpose: 
Fact construction and stabilization are not abstract concerns focused on 
truth and falsity but are bound up with, and inseparable from, practices of 
all sorts. Descriptive categories formulate the world in specific ways which 
are relevant to, and usable in, current activities. Describing and formulating 
are implicated in activities in many different ways (Potter, 1996: p.205). 
The Personhood Movement has demonstrated an acute awareness of this, visible through 
their how-to guide’s and web content as well as the content of the laws they attempt to 
pass. It is time to give the Pro-Life and Personhood Movements due credit for their 
intelligence, dedication, and persistence. Once this is accomplished, it is critical to 
counter them through: 
Returning to a rights framework and bringing the woman back into the 
conversation. Yale Law scholar Reva Siegel draws inspiration from the transnational 
women’s movement and women’s rights arguments to imagine what could have been had 
the Roe decision reflected many of the amici briefs submitted to the court which 
resembled those made is Abele v. Markle9. Specifically, she poses the question: “What 
difference would it make if the court added an equality rational to the privacy 
                                                 
9 Abele v. Markle, the 1972 class action suit in District Court for the District of Connecticut, popularly 
referred to as Women vs. Connecticut, had 858 complainants in a class action suit, all of them women, not 
doctors. The plaintiffs argued abortion restricts were a violation of a woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right 
to life, liberty, and equal protection, and that is was a further violation of the equal protection rights 
guaranteed to poor women. The plaintiffs also asserted a violation of privacy rights protected by the Ninth 
Amendment and that “by imposing motherhood on women for engaging in sex, a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment,” abortion regulations violate the Eighth Amendment. Additional claims were made that they 
“violated the Thirteenth Amendment as a form of involuntary servitude…and violated the Nineteenth 
Amendment by forcing women to become mothers while organizing the core activities of citizenship to 
exclude caregivers” (Siegel, 2010, p. 1890-1892). 
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justification for abortion rights?” (2010, p. 1906) What if Roe had been able to offer a 
more convincing argument for a women’s right to abortion? Siegel contends: 
 Perhaps most obviously at stake is a question of constitutional authority. It 
is relatively safe to challenge constitutional privacy rights as 
‘unenumerated,’ but, calling for the deprivation of rights that vindicate 
women’s equal citizenship is an altogether riskier business—not simply 
because equality rights have a clear textual basis in the Constitution, but 
also because equality rights have trumping political authority (2010, p. 
1906). 
Returning the woman to conversations surrounding reproductive healthcare, personhood, 
and rights is critical. By allowing personhood rhetoric to frame the arguments in terms of 
fetal rights, the rights of the living, breathing woman are sidelined.  This is not some 
hypothetical life being discussed—the pregnant woman has rights and needs of her own 
that must be re-centered as a focal point in the conversation surrounding abortion rights 
as reproductive healthcare. 
 Leverage emotion. One way the woman can be re-centered in the argument is by 
leveraging emotions and utilizing the stories of women. While no woman should feel 
obligated to tell her story, those who have contribute a great deal to counteracting the 
discourse of personhood, which attempts to demonize abortion, the doctors who perform 
it, and even the women who have them. A recent legislative effort, trying the waters for 
future Pro-Life efforts, is a twenty-week abortion ban. This was a test of the extent to 
which fetal personhood has seeped into the national psyche. Many abortion opponents 
rely on the nearness to the point of viability and the humanlike qualities of the fetus at a 
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twenty-week gestational stage to vilify abortion and women who have abortions after that 
point of fetal development. The reality of the situation is only seven percent of abortions 
are after fourteen weeks, and less than two percent are after twenty weeks (Axelrod, 
2018). But, facts and statistics do not make the best-selling points: emotions do. The 
reasons women have abortions after the twenty-week mark bear no resemblance to the 
talking points spread by the Pro-Life and Personhood Movements. The reasons women 
have abortions after the twenty-week mark are generally painful and heartbreaking: grave 
risk to like life or health of the mother or fetal abnormalities incompatible with life 
(Almendrala, 2018; Axelrod, 2018; Drexler, 2018). Abortion is not some horrible thing 
when considered in this context. Why should a woman be forced to bear a child with 
undeveloped or underdeveloped lungs? Why should a woman be forced to bear a child 
and watch it die because it was never equipped to survive outside of the womb? Many 
fetal abnormalities are not apparent until the ultrasound late in the second trimester. If the 
fetus will not survive, is it not more humane to allow the fetus to die (quite literally) 
surrounded by the person who loved it the most? 
 Portraying them as pro-birth, not necessarily pro-life. Many of the laws 
analyzed for this study sought to guarantee the right to equal protection of life “at every 
stage of their biological development, irrespective of age, health, function, or condition 
of dependency.” While this phrase is likely intended to prohibit euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide, it never-the-less has ramifications for zygotes and fetuses with anomalies 
precluding the possibility of sustained life. Being pro-life should be about more than 
simply ensuring a woman gives birth. Being pro-life should also incorporate caring about 
the health, well-being, education, etc. of the child after birth. Quality of life should 
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matter. People opposing the personhood and pro-life arguments would be wise to point 
out that concern for life should encompass a concern for the quality of life. Where is the 
support for social welfare programs? Why are there over 17,000 kids in the Arizona 
Foster Care system alone (Project Jigsaw, 2014)? One key way to undermine personhood 
and pro-life rhetoric is through evidentiary demonstration that their values do not always 
extend after birth. 
 Recognize they do not own the moral high ground. The stance of the Pro-Life 
and Personhood Movement is not the moral stance; claiming to do God’s work 
obfuscates their role in their own actions and releases them of responsibility to consider 
the debate is more nuanced and encompassing than their perspective allows for. The 
notion behind this is similar to reclaiming the emotional aspect of the debate. Often times 
the pro-choice argument falters because we are unwilling to be unabashedly pro-abortion, 
which bolsters the argument that abortion is somehow morally wrong. Recognizing 
abortion as legitimate medical health care helps remove the argument from the realm of 
morals and draw attention to the needs of the woman.  
 Acknowledge shades of gray and nuance. This is the largest blind spot of the 
Personhood Movement—it is critical defenders of women’s autonomy rights do not allow 
them to portray the world as purely black and white or oversimplified. By acknowledging 
that this debate is complicated, we are better situated to bring the woman back into the 
conversation. By acknowledging nuance, ourselves, we also protect ourselves from the 
accusation that we are being extreme or refusing to properly acknowledge alternate 
perspectives.  
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 Call out false equivalencies. False equivalencies in personhood discourse are 
leveraged to vilify the Pro-Choice Movement by invoking imagery of slavery and the 
Holocaust—silence allows these misrepresentations to go unchallenged. It can be 
tempting to wish not to dignify these remarks with a response, but it is dangerous for this 
mindset to become normalized. 
 Leverage the popularity of in-vitro fertilization, stem cell research, and birth 
control. While abortion may be a polarizing subject, in-vitro fertilization, stem cell 
research, and birth control are much less controversial topics. Fetal personhood laws 
threaten all of these practices. Draw attention to the non-abortion issues of reproductive 
autonomy implicated in the debate on fetal personhood, such as contraception and 
fertility treatment; furthermore, call on legislators sponsoring Human Life legislation and 
personhood supporters to go on record about their intention for these laws with regard to 
fertility treatment, such as in vitro (Will, 2013). 
 Go on the offensive. “The best defense is a good offense” may be cliché, but it is 
true. The effort to protect women’s reproductive autonomy from pro-life and personhood 
legislative gains have been largely defensive and reactive. It is critical to shift this and 
work on proactive legislation that will protect the rights of women. Some states have 
begun this process and can provide a blueprint for future efforts. 
 A full-throated endorsement of women’s autonomy and rights. The most critical 
thing I wish to suggest is some genuine reflexivity and outright soul-searching on the part 
of the Pro-Choice Movement. It is not sufficient to be pro-choice when the mainstream 
movement has been entirely too quiet on issues of sterilization abuse, pharmaceutical 
companies engaging in “the promotion of unsafe, long-acting hormonal 
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contraceptives…for women of color, women on federal assistance, and women with 
disabilities” (Smith, 2005, p. 88), the Hyde Amendment, chemical endangerment laws 
being used to punish pregnant women, and the reproductive injustice experienced by 
female inmates (Roth, 2010; 2011) or females crossing the border. As Andrea Smith 
(2005) explains, “The history of Native women and colonial reproductive policies 
demonstrates the political bankruptcy of the ‘choice’ paradigm for articulating a 
reproductive rights agenda” (p. 98). 
 Choice is intimately bound up with possession and resources. The choice 
paradigm is not equally afforded to all and “the pro-choice position actually does not 
ascribe inherent rights to women either. Rather, women are ascribed reproductive choices 
if they can afford them or if they are deemed legitimate choice makers” (Smith, 2005, p. 
99). Personhood legislative victory would potentially negate women as legitimate choice 
makers and abortion as a legitimate choice; mainstream pro-life legislation is increasingly 
rendering choice unaffordable and unavailable. For fear of risking certain successes in 
holding back the erosion of reproductive rights, the mainstream Pro-Choice Movement 
has been deafeningly silent on integral convictions and an inclusive vision. This silence 
has allowed certain aspects of the personhood framework to become accepted and 
mainstream pro-life victories to go unchecked. 
 What is required then, is a full-throated endorsement of the rights and autonomy 
of women—all women, without exception. We need to do better. It is essential that we 
shift the frame to a rights framework which recognizes and validates the citizenship 
rights and autonomy of women. It is equally critical that this not become a hollow 
rebranding exercise, but instead re-centers genuine convictions on the equality and 
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importance of all women. Once this adjustment is made, a Pro-Woman Movement would 
be better situated to authentically disassemble the discursive practices of personhood that 
contribute to detrimental pro-life gains. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Limitations of Current Study  
While I have endeavored to conduct a thorough and rigorous analysis, I 
acknowledge that there are limitations to this study. Perhaps chief among them could be 
that it offers the perspective of a single researcher. This is only partially valid—and, even 
then, much less so than one might assume. No research is the result of a sole individual. 
None. Even in the absence of a research team, the research and drafting processes are a 
collaboration in which multiple opinions and sets of eyes bear influence on the final 
product. Here, too, that is the case. While complete objectivity may be a myth, I still took 
measures to check my interpretations with others as a way of verifying that my findings 
were consistent with the data driving them; I sought data from a variety of sources and 
conducted an intertextual reading as a way of limiting my bias on the research results. 
Another potential critique of the study is the relatively small sample size from a 
narrow slice of available data. Given that the exposure was strictly archival written texts, 
there is a lack of “actualized” praxis. I did not have the opportunity to observe the fetal 
Personhood Movement communicate their message in real life. However, this is not 
necessarily a fatal flaw. I still managed to ascertain a tremendous amount about the 
effects of discursive frames on worldview and legal consciousness by reading across data 
sets and examining both “how to” guides and proposed bills.  
Furthermore, despite the fact that all texts gathered for this research were publicly 
available, they still give a glimpse into the “off-stage” and offer a look at the quasi-
hidden transcripts (Scott, 1990). Take, for example, “7 Ways to Change How you Speak 
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about Abortion;” this is posted publicly, visible to anyone who looks for it. However, it 
clearly has an intended audience of pro-life, pro-personhood activists who are going 
forward to spread the message of life. While the majority of the document is acerbic in 
tone, it takes a shift towards the end10. This offers a glimpse into the quasi-hidden 
communication of the movement and demonstrates their level of awareness of issues such 
as footing, stake, and stake inoculation. While this insight is not the same as being 
embedded within a group, the publicly available private advice giving provided valuable 
understandings none-the-less. 
Conclusion 
Pro-life legal scholars and activists are often quite realistic about the amount of 
work and certainty of a “protracted legal effort” (Galebach, 1984, p. 123) required to pass 
and ratify a Human Life Amendment. However, many maintain that it is a moral 
imperative because leaving any form of life unprotected is unacceptable and—in their 
view—should be unconstitutional. They take hope in the idea that, while Roe v. Wade 
(1973) may have declared a fetus was not a person for the purpose of the 14th 
Amendment, the ruling does not explicitly eliminate the possibility of a fetus being a 
person for other purposes—if the fetus can be recognized as a person for other purposes, 
                                                 
10 The specific example I am thinking of is notable in their coaching: 
 “These are just a few ideas to help you modify your language in order to foster a more pro-life 
culture. There are many other ways to do this, but hopefully these provide some food for thought 
and a starting point…it is probably worth pointing out that there are circumstances where using 
these terms is not the most effective thing to do. I don’t recommend using them in all 
circumstances, but only when their use will help further the pro-life mindset or provide clarity and 
contemplation of the problems with the pro-abortion stance...When speaking to a woman who has 
had an abortion, it’s not likely to be very kind or very effective to speak of her going to an abortion 
mill to commit abortion. When talking to people who are trying to converse rationally and calmly 
about the topic of abortion, it may not be best to continually call them pro-aborts…So using a little 
wisdom in how you insert these terms into your speech is recommended.” (Harold, 2017) 
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it is only a matter of time before a larger attitudinal shift can change the constitutional 
status as well. Some advocates of personhood contend incremental victories in attaining 
recognition for fetal rights in states like Texas will set the stage for a major fetal rights 
victory: the recognition of the legal presence of the fetus in tort law, property law, 
criminal law, etc. undermine one of the central presuppositions of Roe v. Wade, and will 
thus lead to Roe’s undoing (Wagner, 2010). This logic rests on inconsistency in existing 
law, asking: “How could its statute support the contention that a fetus is a person and 
then allow for the killing of a fetus in certain scenarios” (Wagner, 2010, p. 1093)? There 
is a theme of an overly simplistic view that a Human Life Amendment, defining life from 
the moment of conception, and incremental redefinitions of personhood would protect 
unborn life and end abortion. This neglects the reality that the constitution does not 
guarantee life—if guarantees the state will not deprive a person of life without due 
process.   
Other scholars examining feticide laws and addressing concerns about how they 
reclassify the fetus as a person in criminal laws reject the notion that these laws will 
contribute to the success of fetal personhood because there is a difference between 
legislative personhood and natural personhood. Statutes bestowing rights or legal 
recognition of the fetus protect States’, not fetal interests (Forsythe, 1996; Forsythe and 
Burke, 2007; Crist, 2010). Forsythe (1996) makes a similar observation, noting the 
distinction between state and federal law as well as criminal and constitutional law: 
A constitutional amendment is not a criminal code; it does not act to 
proscribe criminal conduct. An amendment that gave unborn children the 
protections of the 14th Amendment would not touch individual conduct, 
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only state action. States don’t usually commit abortions, individual 
abortionists do. Likewise, a constitutional amendment is not self-enforcing. 
An amendment would need enabling legislation at the federal or state level 
to effectively touch individual conduct (p. 1-2). 
This is at the heart of what causes Linton to remark “the recognition of ‘personhood,’ 
although desirable, is not the ‘cure-all’ for ending abortion” (2009, p. 61) . 
While personhood is debated as a “silver bullet” to end abortion, the incremental 
approach towards eroding abortion rights and establishing fetal rights through 
personhood compliant laws and proposed Human Life Amendments are strong examples 
of how “reproductive practices themselves constituted a social text to which many 
cultural contestants laid claim” (Holc, 2004, p. 762). Often, women get lost in the 
conversation—sidelined completely (Holc, 2014; Johnsen, 2014; Ginsberg, 1985; Siegel, 
2010; Madrazo, 2014). This is significant because laws contribute to the framework 
through which citizens understand and make sense of their worlds. Legislative efforts 
aimed at regulating reproductive practices contribute to how citizens categorize and 
interpret identity for themselves and others. These categories play a broader role in a 
sense of belonging or a proclivity towards “othering”: (Holc, 2004, p. 760). Beyond 
implications for self-identity, the introduction of personhood into the legal and cultural 
discourse contributes to the way societies view fetuses and the women carrying them. 
This contributes to “factors enabling the fetus to silence the woman” (Holc, 2004, p. 759) 
and is one of the ways in which women are relegated to a supporting cast role. Here, they 
are background figures who are involuntarily constructed as mothers—along with all the 
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attributes and stereotypes implicitly attached based on the woman’s positionality 
(Madrazo, 2014, p. 333). 
Utilizing legal avenues, the state constructs a social environment in which 
abortion is viewed in a negative light and stigmatized within the community. This creates 
a situation in which women are less likely to receive the support they need and more 
likely to take furtive measures. Abortion, a currently legal act, becomes a social 
transgression—something that only severely misguided or immoral women would 
consider a viable option. In this way, what a moral woman or a good mother is defined to 
be is also constructed through abortion restrictions. This dichotomy perpetuates the social 
stigma of abortion and additionally contributes to racializing the conversation due to the 
disparate effects of reproductive injustice.  By creating the “bad mother” archetype the 
state now has a powerful propaganda tool it can leverage to attempt to shore up racial 
solidarity over gender solidarity in order to “[blunt] the radical potential of women’s 
political participation” (Olson, 2004, p. 57). 
The normalization of the discourse of personhood contributes immensely to this 
process. Thus, even without a legislative victory in the form of a Human Life 
Amendment, the Personhood Movement is having an impact. An overly simplified 
worldview and a black and white mentality are visible in the discursive and framing 
practices of the fetal Personhood Movement across multiple levels and sites of analysis. 
The linguistic choices demonstrate, constitute, and reinforce the dominant narratives of 
the movement that are integral to advocacy, praxis, and legislative efforts. Movement 
cognition is shaped by a repetitive engagement with emotionally charged rhetoric which 
relies on patterns of omission and exclusion, troubling phrases, and the power of labels. 
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The rhetorical practices and representational framework of the Personhood Movement are 
altering the national discourse surrounding start of life and abortion. The extreme views 
of the Personhood Movement change the debate and relocate the middle—effectively 
allowing for dangerous pro-life legislation to slide by under the radar because they seem 
mild in comparison to the hyperbolic rhetoric of the Personhood Movement. 
This poses a danger to women and disproportionately impacts poor, rural, 
minority, indigenous, and otherwise marginalized women. For all these reasons, it is 
critical that the representational, discursive, and framing practices of the Personhood 
Movement are undermined. I call on the Choice Movement to be rigorously honest with 
themselves and take a thoroughly reflexive self-assessment—to recognize areas in which 
an over-willingness to compromise has excluded certain bodies, to remedy this lack of 
conviction in the movement, and to move forward with a full-throated endorsement of 
women’s autonomy and rights. 
Directions for Future Research 
 Future research would be well served to take a deeper dive into the movement and 
available texts. There are more bills, more organizations, and more websites, as well as a 
variety of different methodologies that could be utilized. The gathering of ethnographic 
or interview data could enable observing the discourse as an interactive exchange where 
both sides are visible. This could also make discernable the level of commitment and, 
with proper exposure, facilitate further analysis of differences within the Personhood 
Movement. 
 I argue that, despite some verbal sparring, the Pro-Life and Personhood 
Movements have a symbiotic relationship.  Engaging a stronger temporal focus and 
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examining pro-life and pro-personhood legislation in tandem could help illuminate the 
degree to which the movements affect each other. In the future, it would be wise to 
conduct research designed to assess the effect of repetitive exposure to the personhood 
framework on cognition, subsequent debates, and voting tendencies. 
 The study of the Personhood Movement and their legal construction offers many 
research possibilities across disciplines: law, psychology, communication, political 
science, etc. For the sake of effective advocacy, it is important future research ask, and 
try to answer in detail: who, exactly, are these people? How active are they in their 
advocacy? How organized are they? (Hint: very.) Choice advocates need to take a good 
look at their own work, and then further ask: what more can be done to undermine the 
personhood rhetoric and its effects? Is it possible to reconstitute the middle? And, is it 
even desirable to find a compromise?  
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EXAMINED FEDERAL HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT PROPOSALS, 1973-1983 
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Year Bill Designation Bill Name 
1973 H. J. Res. 261 Hogan Amendment 
1973 H. J. Res. 472 Whitehurst Amendment 
1973 S. J. Res. 119 Buckley Amendment 
1973 H. J. Res. 769 Burke Amendment 
1974 H. J. Res 1041 Roncallo Amendment 
1975 S.J. Res. 6 Helms Amendment 
1975 S. J. Res. 11 National Right to Life Council (NRLC) Amendment 
1975 S.J. Res. 91                                             Scott Amendment 
1975 H.J. Res. 681                                           Noonan Amendment 
1979 H. J. Res. 294 Paramount Amendment 
1981 S.J. Res. 110                                   Hatch Amendment 
1981 S. J. Res 137                        NRLC Unity Amendment 
1983 S. J. Res. 3 Hatch Eagleton Amendment 
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EXAMINED FEDERAL HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT PROPOSALS, 2003-2017 
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Year Bill Designation Bill Name   
2003 H.R. 3069 Right to Life Act 
2005 H.R. 552 Right to Life Act 
2009 H.R. 881 Right to Life Act 
2011 H.R. 374 Life at Conception Act 
2013 H.R. 1091 Life at Conception Act 
2017 S. 231 Life at Conception Act of 2017 
2017 H.R.681 Life at Conception Act 
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EXAMINED STATE HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT-STYLE LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSALS 
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Year State Designation 
2004 North Dakota ND Measure 1, "Life Begins at Conception" Amendment 
2008 Colorado CO Initiative 48 
2017 Alaska AK House Bill 250 
2017 Indiana IN House Bill 1134 
2017 Iowa IA House File 297 
2017 Iowa IA Senate File 253 
2017 Kansas KS House Concurrent Resolution 5009 
2017 Kansas KS Senate Concurrent Resolution 1607 
2017 Michigan MI House Bill 4279 
2017  Missouri MO House Bill 14, “Missouri Right to Life Act” 
2017 Missouri MO House Joint Resolution 18 
2017 South Carolina SC Bill 217, "Personhood Act of South Carolina"  
2017 Texas TX Senate Joint Resolution 9 
2017 Texas TX House Joint Resolution 104 
2017 Texas TX House Joint Resolution 121 
2017 Texas TX House Joint Resolution 122 
2017 Texas TX House Joint Resolution 123 
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APPENDIX E 
 
SELECTED CODING FROM EXAMINED FEDERAL BILLS,  
1973-1983 AND CONTEMPORARY 
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Coding Phrasing # Source Text 
Fetal/female 
relation 
“irrespective of…condition of 
dependency” 
4 SJ Res 119 
(1973) 
HJ Res 769 
(1973) 
SJ Res 11 (1975) 




"irrespective of…condition of 
physical dependency" 




"without regard to…condition of 
dependency" 




“unborn offspring” 2 SJ Res 119 
(1973) 








"unborn offspring;" "unborn person" 2 SJ Res 11 (1975) 








"preborn human person;" "human 
being" 
7 HR 3069 (2003) 
HR 552 (2005) 
HR 881 (2009) 
HR 374 (2011) 
HR 1091 (2013) 
S. 231 (2017) 
HR 681 (2017) 
Fetus as 
subject/citizen 
"human being, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States."  
1 SJ Res 6 (1975) 
Fetus as 
subject/citizen 
"human being,…within its 
jurisdiction." 




  12 SJ Res 110 
(1981) 
HJ Res 261 
(1973) 
SJ Res 3 (1983) 
SJ Res 6 (1975) 
HJ Res 681 
(1975) 
SJ Res 11 (1975) 
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HJ Res 294 
(1979) 
HJ Res 1041 
(1974) 
SJ Res 91 (1975) 
HJ Res 427 
(1973) 
HR 3069 (2003) 
HR 552 (2005) 
Mother role & 
fetus/female 
relations 
“her unborn child” 5 HR 374 (2011) 
HR 1091 (2013) 
S. 231 (2017) 
HR 681 (2017) 




“this article shall not apply in an 
emergency when a reasonable 
medical certainty exists that 
continuation of the pregnancy will 
cause the death of the mother.” 





“No abortion shall be performed by 
any person except under and in 
conformance with law permitting an 
abortion to be performed only in an 
emergency when a reasonable 
medical certainty exists that 
continuation of the pregnancy will 
cause the death of the mother…” 





“nothing in this article shall prohibit 
a law permitting only those medical 
procedure required to prevent the 
death of the mother.” 




“nothing in this article shall prohibit 
a law allowing justification to be 
shown for only those medical 
procedures required to prevent the 
death of either the pregnant woman, 
or her unborn offspring…” 




  11 SJ Res 110 
(1981) 
SJ Res 3 (1983) 
SJ Res 6 (1975) 
HJ Res 261 
(1973) 
HJ Res 681 
(1975) 
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HJ Res 294 
(1979) 
HJ Res 1041 
(1974) 
SJ Res 91 (1975) 
HJ Res 427 
(1973) 
HR 3069 (2003) 





 "nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to require the prosecution 
of any woman for the death of her 
unborn child" 
3 HR 374 (2011) 
HR 1091 (2013) 





“nothing in this act shall be construed 
to authorize the prosecution of any 
woman for the death of her unborn 
child.” 







"nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to require the prosecution 
of any woman for the death of her 
unborn child, a prohibition on in vitro 
fertilization, or a prohibition on use 
of birth control or other means of 
preventing fertilization" 
1 S. 231 (2017) 
Naming 
Practices 
"Right to Life Act" 3 HR 3069 (2003) 
HR 552 (2005) 
HR 881 (2009) 
Naming 
Practices 
"Life at Conception Act" 4 HR 374 (2011) 
HR 1091 (2013) 
S. 231 (2017) 
HR 681 (2017) 
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SELECTED CODING FROM EXAMINED STATE BILLS 
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Coding Phrasing # Source Text 
Exemption--
contraception 
"This section shall not be 
construed to…prohibit the 
use of any means of 
contraception." 
2 IA HF 297 (2017) 
IA HF 253 (2017) 
Exemption--Criminal 
or civil prosecution 
"This section shall not be 
construed to…impose civil 
or criminal liability on a 
woman upon whom an 
abortion is performed" 
2 IA HF 297 (2017) 




"nothing in this section shall 
be construed to require 
prosecution of a woman for 
the death of her unborn child 
if there is a diagnosis made 
by a medical practitioner of 
an imminent threat to the life 
of the mother and of the 
fetus…" 
1 MI HB 4279 
(2017) 
Exemptions (none)   2 TX SJR 9 (2017-
2018)   
TX HJR 122 
(2017) 
Exemptions--criminal 
prosecution, in vitro, 
birth control 
"nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to require the 
prosecution of any woman 
for the death of her unborn 
child, a prohibition on in 
vitro fertilization, or a 
prohibition on use of birth 
control or other means of 
preventing fertilization" 
2 TX HJR 123 
(2017)    




"Subsections (c) or (d) do not 
prohibit a person from 
receiving an abortion if: (1) 
the case is a medical 
emergency as defined by…" 




"Subsections (c) or (d) do not 
prohibit a person from 
receiving an abortion if:…(2) 
the pregnancy was induced 
by cause of product of rape 
or incest" 
1 TX HJR 121 
(2017) 
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Fetal/female relations "irrespective of…condition 
of dependency" 
2 KS SCR 1607 
(2017)    
KS SCR 5009 
(2017) 
Humanizing Fetus "unborn child" 3 TX SJR 9 (2017-
2018) 
TX HJR 122 
(2017)    
TX HJR 121 
(2017) 
Humanizing Fetus "citizen of this state" 2 TX SJR 9 (2017-
2018)    
TX HJR 123 
(2017) 
Humanizing Fetus "unborn children;" "unborn 
child" 
1 TX HJR 123 
(2017) 
Humanizing Fetus "right to life of all humans, 
born and unborn" 
1 MO HB 14 (2017) 
Humanizing Fetus "human being" 2 KS SCR 1607 
(2017)     
KS SCR 5009 
(2017) 
Humanizing Fetus "preborn humans" 2 KS SCR 1607 
(2017)    
KS SCR 5009 
(2017) 
Humanizing Fetus "unborn human child" 1 MO HB 18 (2017) 
Language of war, 
violence 
"exercise its police powers" 2 KS SCR 1607 
(2017)    
KS SCR 5009 
(2017) 
Language of war, 
violence 
"remain a class of human 
beings that can intentionally 
be killed." 
2 KS SCR 1607 
(2017)    
KS SCR 5009 
(2017) 
Mother role "her unborn child" 3 TX HJR 123 
(2017)    
TX HJR 121 
(2017)    
MI HB 4279 
(2017) 
Mother role "life of the mother" 1 MI HB 4279 
(2017) 
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Omitted (woman)   3 TX SJR 9 (2017-
2018) 
TX HJR 122 
(2017)     
MO HB 14 (2017) 
Woman as victim "woman upon who an 
abortion is performed" 
2 IA HF 297 (2017)    
IA HF 253 (2017) 
Scientific Jargon "the species homo sapiens" 3 TX HJR 123 
(2017)    
TX HJR 121 
(2017)     
MI HB 4279 
(2017) 
Scientific Jargon "fetus" 1 MI HB 4279 
(2017) 
Scientific Jargon "fertilized embryo that is no 
longer in utero" 
1 MI HB 4279 
(2017) 
Scientific Jargon "biological development" 3 KS SCR 1607 
(2017)      
KS SCR 5009 
(2017)      
MO HB 18 (2017) 
Scientific Jargon "gamete," "ovum," "zygote" 2 IA HF 297 (2017)    
IA HF 253 (2017) 
Specific mention of 
abortion 
"abortion is prohibited in this 
state" 
4 TX SJR 9 (2017-
2018)     
TX HJR 123 
(2017) 
TX HJR 122 
(2017) 
TX HJR 121 
(2017) 
Specific mention of 
abortion 
"Nothing in this constitution 
secures or protects a right to 
abortion or requires the 
funding of abortion." 
1 MO HB 18 (2017) 
Specific mention of 
abortion 
"This section shall not be 
construed to create or 
recognize a right to an 
abortion" 
2 IA HF 297 (2017)    
IA HF 253 (2017) 
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Coding Phrasing Source 
Humanizing fetus "child in womb" Talk the Talk (ALL) 
Humanizing fetus "the baby is a person" Talk the Talk (ALL) 
Humanizing fetus "preborn child" Talk the Talk (ALL) 
Humanizing fetus "newly created human being" Rape and Incest (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "unborn child" The Mothers Life (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "the baby" The Mothers Life (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "both patients" The Mothers Life (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "the child" The Mothers Life (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "preborn baby" The Mothers Life (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "the preborn child is a person" The Mothers Life (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "preborn humans" What We Do To Help (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "child" What We Do To Help (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "preborn children" What We Do To Help (PI) 
Humanizing fetus "most innocent of our brothers 
and sisters" 
Declaration of Truth and 
Life (ALL) 
Humanizing fetus "her baby" Why We Must Vote Prolife 
(GRTL) 
Humanizing fetus "innocent child" Why We Must Vote Prolife 
(GRTL) 




"to kill a preborn baby" The Mothers Life (PI) 
Language of 
violence 
"the dehumanization and 
murder of preborn children" 
What We Do To Help (PI) 
Language of 
violence 
"the pro-life fight is God’s 
battle" 








"This violent solution" Why We Must Vote Prolife 
(GRTL) 
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Language of 
violence 
"killing of an innocent child" Why We Must Vote Prolife 
(GRTL) 
Science (belittling) "By the way, human fetus is 
just scientific jargon for little 
one" 
Talk the Talk (ALL) 
Science (belittling) "fallible theories" Declaration of Truth and 
Life (ALL) 
Science (Invoking) "...and that's just pure science" Talk the Talk (ALL) 
Science (Invoking) "personhood for every human 
being exists and forever will 
exist from the first moment of 
biological development" 




"the mother" The Mothers Life (PI) 
Woman (assigned 
role) 
"her baby" Why We Must Vote Prolife 
(GRTL) 
Woman (Erased) refers to pregnancy as the 
result of incest as "the 
criminal's children" and 
"criminal's innocent children" 
Rape and Incest (PI) 
Woman 
(independent) 
"pregnant woman" The Mothers Life (PI) 
Woman (omitted) 
 
Rape and Incest (PI) 
Woman (omitted) 
 
What We Do To Help (PI) 
Woman (omitted) 
 
Declaration of Truth and 
Life (ALL) 
Woman (victim) "each time an abortion occurs, 
a woman is victimized" 
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UMRELLA CODE: OVERSIMPLIFICATION 
Coding Phrasing Source 
Absolutism "absolute Truth" Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
Absolutism "God's objective Truth" Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
Absolutism "not a compilation of 
personal opinions and 
fallible theories" 
Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
Absolutism "Objective Truth exists. 
It does not change." 
Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
Absolutism "a complete, 
unwavering 
commitment to God and 
the babies" 
Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
Absolutism "Only Truth can be our 
point of unification" 
Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
Absolutism "unity has no value 
without adherence to 
absolute truth" 
Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
Absolutism "a complete, 
unwavering 
commitment to God and 
the babies" 
Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
If/Then If we make this 
commitment, I am 
confident that God will 
bless our efforts. 
Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
If/Then; Either/or; removing 
the middle 
"Either the preborn 
child is a person, or the 
child is not a person. 
Since the preborn child 
is a person, there can be 
no exception for 
abortion." 
The Mothers Life (PI) 
Removing the middle "Once pro-lifers say 
there can be a 'good 
reason' to kill a preborn 
baby, the foundation of 
the pro-life movement 
The Mothers Life (PI) 
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crumbles. The argument 
is lost."  
Removing the middle "there is no conceivable 
circumstance 
(exception) that justifies 
an abortion" 
Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
Removing the middle "no one is exempt" Declaration of Truth 
and Life (ALL) 
Removing the middle "the bottom line is 
always the same…" 
Talk the Talk (ALL) 
Removing the middle "just as non-negotiable" Talk the Talk (ALL) 
Removing the middle "that's just the way…" Talk the Talk (ALL) 
Removing the middle "If one claims to be 
'pro-choice,' it means 
that the person has no 
problem with the object 
of the choice, abortion." 
Talk the Talk (ALL) 
Specious comparison "Since the country 
began, the issues that 
move us have been 
different and varied. 
The issue of 
discrimination is a case 
in point. The "Dred 
Scott" Supreme Court 
decision in 1857, 
denying personhood to 
black Americans" 
Why We Must Vote 
Prolife (GRTL) 
Thou shall nots "one should never 
attempt to codify in the 
Law the importance of 
one innocent human life 
above another." 
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Source: THE-MOTHERS-LIFE 
              Personhood Iowa 




Once pro-lifers say there can be a “good reason” 
 
to kill a preborn baby,  
 
the foundation of the pro-life movement crumbles.  
 
The argument is lost.  
 
Either the preborn child is a person,  
 
or the child is not a person.  
 
Since the preborn child is a person,  
 






Quotations used to ironize 
Kill=language of violence Preborn baby=humanizing 
fetus 
Oversimplified, all or 
nothing thinking; leaves 
no room for middle 
ground. 
Hyperbolic; oversimplified, all or nothing thinking 
 
Preborn child=humanizing fetus 
Oversimplified, either/or sentence structure--limiting 
Preborn child=humanizing fetus 
 
Simplified, if/then sentence 
structure--limiting 
No exception=oversimplified, black and white, 
no middle ground 
No mention of the woman 
Interesting that “mothers life” is not written by them as possessive, as if the 
life of the woman does not belong to the woman 
